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Abstract 
 Navigating the environment and making everyday decisions is a process plagued by 
noise, uncertainty, and non-stationary contingencies. Efficient and effective action is predicated 
upon a stable internal representation of the environment that guides action without extensive or 
exhaustive observation, deliberation, and alteration at the slightest deviation from expected 
outcomes. The ability of individuals to build these mental models and update them as needed 
represents a critical component of everyday decision and action. The current thesis provides an 
in-depth exploration of this construct though a series of brain imaging and behavioural 
experiments examining the neural correlates of mental model building and updating focusing on 
how other cognitive abilities (i.e., working memory and attention) influence the speed and 
accuracy of these processes. Brain imaging results highlight a network of frontal, parietal, and 
subcortical areas that support mental model updating. Follow-up behavioural experiments reveal 
both working memory and attention to be important gating mechanisms to the processing of 
environmental stimuli that comprise a mental model. Taken together, the results point to a robust 
neural network coupled with working memory and attentional gating mechanisms that support 
this behaviour.  
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
 Interacting with a complex and dynamic environment requires an ability to represent the 
environment and flexibility to adjust to changes amidst uncertainty and noise. Ideally, such a 
process would allow individuals to make optimal predictions about their environment and the 
consequences of their actions without excessive observation and deliberation. Throughout this 
thesis, these processes are collectively referred to as mental model building and updating. 
Extensive research has proposed numerous underlying mechanisms that support mental model 
building an updating, from heuristics (Tversky & Kahneman, 1974; Gaissmaier & Schooler, 
2008), statistical learning (Saffran, Johnson, Aslin, & Newport, 1999; Fiser & Aslin, 2001; 2002) 
to Bayesian cognition (Yu, 2007; Nassar, Wilson, Heasly, & Gold, 2010). Common among these 
is the axiom that individuals seek an expedient understanding of their environment through 
intuitive reasoning and observation for the purpose of decision-making and action (Griffiths & 
Tenenbaum, 2006; Tenenbaum, Kemp, Griffiths, & Goodman, 2011, Johnson-Laird, 2013).  
 Mental models, as defined here, are representations of the regularities in the environment 
that form a cognitive construct to inform decision making and action that facilitates predictions 
concerning the outcomes of those decisions/actions (i.e., “What will happen next?”; e.g., 
Danckert, Stöttinger, Quehl, & Anderson, 2012). For example, one could have a mental model of 
how long it takes to get to work based on repeated timings of their commute factoring in traffic 
patterns, distance, various routes, and ancillary tasks that need to be completed upon arrival (e.g., 
paying for parking, walking to the office from the parking lot). A considerable amount of 
variables and information gets condensed into a representation of time and variance that allow us 
to work backwards to ensure we rarely arrive late despite the confluence of factors that could 
otherwise conspire to delay us. There are numerous examples of such feedforward predictive 
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models in the literature. Anything from playing competitive games to finding the way to the 
bathroom in the middle of the night without stubbing your toe, require individuals to model their 
environment to make optimal predictions and motivate efficient action (Wolpert, 2007; Wolbers, 
Hegarty, Büchel, & Loomis, 2008; Zhu, Mathewson, & Hsu, 2012; Kwon & Knill, 2013; 
Stöttinger, Filipowicz, Danckert, & Anderson, 2014). 
While mental models are useful for making predictions and guiding efficient action, their 
utility is contingent on their ability to adapt when circumstances change or feedback 
demonstrates that the model needs to be updated (Danckert et al., 2012, Stöttinger et al., 2014, 
Valadao, Anderson, & Danckert, 2015). Using an earlier example, should the city decide to 
embark on an ambitious construction project in the middle of the winter, the internal model of 
how long it takes to get to work may change drastically even though the individual lives just as 
close to their job as they once did. Failure to update in this instance would lead to potentially 
costly delays. For successful updating to take place, one would first need to detect a mismatch 
between expected and observed outcomes in the environment, thereby triggering re-evaluation 
and accumulation of evidence in the pursuit of a newly formulated model (d’Acremont, Fornari, 
& Bossaerts, 2013a; 2013b). There exists ample evidence in the literature suggesting that healthy 
individuals are capable of making such shifts as environmental contingencies change (Brown & 
Steyvers, 2009; Berniker, Voss, & Kording, 2010; Nassar, Wilson, Heasly, & Gold, 2010; Green, 
Benson, Kersten, & Schrater, 2010) in addition to indications that diffuse brain damage impairs 
this ability (Danckert et al., 2012).  
The current thesis examines how individuals build and update models of their 
environment by examining the neural and cognitive bases for how the process takes place. 
Chapter 2 examined the neural networks underlying model updating by having individuals play a 
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serial decision making game against a computer opponent using a variety of often-exploitable 
strategies, while being scanned in an fMRI scanner. Chapters 3 and 4 explored the influence of 
working memory (Chapter 3; WM; Baddeley, 1992, 1993) and attention (Chapter 4; Posner, 
Snyder, & Davidson, 1980) on how well individuals are able to build and update simple models 
of their environment. These chapters contribute to a broader literature implicating these abilities 
in the process of learning from regularity in the environment (Nissen & Bullemer, 1987; 
Corbetta & Shulman, 2002; Toro, Sinnet, and Soto-Faraco, 2005; Turk-Browne, Jungé, and 
Scholl, 2005; Unsworth & Engle, 2005; de Gardelle & Summerfield, 2011; Albrecht, Scholl, & 
Chun, 2012; Annac, Manginelli, Pollmann, Shi, Müller, & Geyer, 2013; Manginelli, Langer, 
Klose, & Pollmann, 2013; Zhao, Al-Aidroos, & Turk-Browne, 2013; Kabata, Yokoyama, 
Noguchi, and Kita, 2014).  
Results in the following chapters suggest the presence of a neural network consisting of 
frontal, parietal, and subcortical areas that include the anterior insula and cingulate cortex that 
play a role in supporting the ability of individuals to mentally represent and exploit regularity in 
their environment. In addition, behavioural data highlight the importance of unconstrained WM 
and attentional resources in supporting this ability. The final chapter provides a summary of key 
findings across the current thesis and a discussion of limitations and suggestions for future 
research. 
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Chapter 2: Neural Correlates of Updating1 
2.1. Introduction 
Interactions with our environment are characterized by uncertainty, noisy input, 
distractions, and non-stationary contingencies. As such, behaviourally and cognitively efficient 
interactions require stable and robust internal representations of those aspects of the environment 
most relevant to a desired goal. Such representations – or ‘mental models’ – allow us to make 
optimal decisions without having to waste precious time and resources considering all possible 
outcomes or oversampling the environment (Tenenbaum, Kemp, Griffiths, & Goodman, 2011). 
These mental models reflect the distillation of relevant sources of information and observed 
outcomes into an actionable hypothesis space that is capable of being learned, evaluated in real 
time, and aids in imposing structure over our chaotic environment (Johnson-Laird, 2013). 
Additionally, as the environment changes, a critical component of mental models is that they are 
capable of updating to ensure optimal behavior under mutable contexts. 
Mental models, and their applications, have been demonstrated in numerous domains. As 
evidenced from the action and perception literature, models of space facilitate way-finding in the 
absence or degradation of visual input (Wolbers, Hegarty, Büchel, & Loomis, 2008). Baseball 
players learn the speed tendencies of pitchers to perfectly time and place swings within a time 
window smaller than the blink of an eye (Kwon & Knill, 2013). Indeed, the fluidity and 
economy of our movements have been suggested to rely partially on an existing model that 
facilitates feed-forward inferences about the desired goal state accounting for prior experience in 
performing requisite actions (Wolpert, 2007).  
1 A version of this chapter is under review as Valadao, D. F., Anderson, B., & Danckert, J. Parietal and Cingulate 
Cortex Involvement in Strategy Updating Using a Serial Competitive Zero-Sum Game. Frontiers in 
Neuroscience. It is reproduced here with permission. 
 5 
Mental models have also been shown to be important across a range of cognitive 
domains. For example, visual search has been shown to be more efficient as the configuration of 
distractors becomes more consistent (i.e., contextual cueing; Jiang, Swallow, & Rosenbaum, 
2013), suggesting the presence of a higher order representation that aids in efficient processing. 
Furthermore, a number of studies have begun to reconsider the influence of sequential effects 
(e.g., the “gambler’s fallacy” and “probability matching” behaviours), long believed to be 
evidence of suboptimal human decision making (Tversky & Kahneman, 1974). That is, these so-
called ‘suboptimal’ strategies can be recast as a reflection of an individual’s attempt to model 
global changes in the environment by representing local changes in statistical probabilities (Yu 
& Cohen, 2009; Gaissmaier & Schooler, 2008; Green, Benson, Kersten, & Schrater, 2010; 
Griffiths & Tenenbaum, 2006).  
Bayesian theorists have long suggested that individuals enter a given context with a set 
prior, namely an implicit but demonstrable belief about the elements of a task or the probability 
of relevant events (Tenenbaum et al., 2011). Such priors allow us to determine how discrepant a 
given outcome is relative to predictions based on the prior, which in turn can be used to evaluate 
the efficacy of an existing model (Yu, 2007; Nassar, Wilson, Heasly, & Gold, 2010). Thus, this 
mechanism represents one plausible way in which mental models can be updated to 
accommodate new information.  
 Research on statistical learning has also suggested that individuals are capable of 
representing regularities evident in a seemingly random and chaotic environment (Saffran, 
Johnson, Aslin, & Newport, 1999), and are capable of doing so practically at birth (Bulf, 
Johnson, & Valenza, 2011). By passively observing the environment, one is able to extract the 
statistical organization of objects or events through either its spatial configuration or temporal 
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order, by extracting the transitional probabilities that exist between a set of items or sounds 
(Fiser & Aslin, 2001; 2002). This process typically occurs without awareness and is 
demonstrated by higher than chance performance on forced-choice recognition tasks or by 
behavioural facilitation in speeded response tasks (Turk-Browne, Jungé, & Scholl, 2005). While 
models like those discussed above are undoubtedly useful and efficient means of interacting with 
our world, they would be of little utility if they were unable to change in step with changes 
evident in the environment. As new information contradicts the outcomes predicted by an 
existing model, the model should be updated to account for these events.  
A number of studies have pointed to spontaneous updating of mental models based on 
participants’ observation of new information that contradicts a prior model. Research from our 
lab indicates that healthy individuals are capable of detecting a change in a computer’s play 
strategy in a zero-sum game and subsequently act to exploit it by choosing the option that 
increases their win rate (Danckert, Stöttinger, Quehl, & Anderson, 2012). Brown and Steyvers 
(2009) showed that participants optimally change judgments regarding the nature of an 
underlying distribution of events in step with true changes to the distribution. Indeed, recent 
research has shown that individuals are capable of dynamically shifting their priors over time in 
order to compensate for a shifting environment (Berniker, Voss, & Kording, 2010). Bayesian 
computational models corroborate these results with models that utilize non-stationary priors, 
which allow the model to modify and rebuild an existing prior as a function of the extent to 
which a prediction error exceeds acceptable limits of uncertainty (Nassar et al., 2010; Wilder, 
Jones, & Mozer, 2009).  
Aside from updating in response to discrepant observations, models can also change 
when more information is gleaned about the underlying generative process of seemingly random 
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data. Green and colleagues (2010) explicitly cued participants to the underlying probability of 
outcomes being generated by manipulating a physical aspect of the task (i.e., changing the shape 
of a pinwheel such that larger sections reflected greater probability of a target landing in that 
area). When the physical change indicated higher target probability for a given region, 
participants abandoned the typical ‘probability matching’ behavior (i.e., choosing a given target 
region as often as they observed targets appearing there; Geng, Soosman, Sun, DiQuattro, 
Stankevitch, & Minzenberg, 2013) in favour of the more optimal ‘maximization’ strategy (i.e., 
choosing the larger region 100% of the time; see Koehler and James, 2010 for review). Taken 
together, these studies suggest that individuals are constantly seeking to accurately represent 
their environment; and when given discrepant information or cued to additional relevant 
information, they update their model and shift behaviour accordingly. The research discussed 
above highlights the well-established prevalence and importance of mental models. Furthermore, 
numerous learning mechanisms have been proposed for how mental models of the environment 
are generated. However, the neural correlates of this behavior have yet to be clearly laid out. 
We previously examined the ability of brain-damaged individuals to develop and update 
an internal model of a non-stationary biased strategy of a computer player in a zero-sum 
decision-making game (i.e., “rock, paper, scissors”; Danckert et al., 2012). Participants played 
against a computer that, while initially playing randomly, began to adopt a biased strategy, 
playing one option more often than others (Danckert et al., 2012). By the end of the experiment 
the computer opponent had adopted a strong bias (i.e., one option played on 80% of trials). 
Unsurprisingly, healthy controls (age-matched to our groups of neurological patients) effectively 
detected and exploited the bias by playing the optimal choice to beat the opponent more 
frequently. In fact, healthy controls demonstrated the commonly observed, although suboptimal, 
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probability matching behavior. That is, they chose the play option that would beat their 
opponent’s biased choice approximately 80% of the time (which would lead on average to only a 
64% win rate). In contrast, left brain damage (LBD) patients actually outperformed controls by 
adopting a probability maximizing strategy – i.e., by choosing the option that would beat the 
most likely computer choice (played on 80% of trials) 100% of the time thereby leading to an 
80% win rate. Right-brain damaged (RBD) patients took significantly longer to begin exploiting 
the bias and failed to fully capitalize on the bias at the levels obtained by the either controls or 
LBD patients, with the bulk of the RBD group continuing to play randomly even when faced 
with an opponent’s strong bias. Lesion overlay analyses in the RBD group indicated that the 
superior temporal gyrus (STG), insula and putamen were commonly involved and are thus likely 
to be important structures for updating a mental model. Those same structures were again 
implicated in a second group of RBD patients we studied who failed to update play strategy in a 
different version of rock, paper, scissors and took longer to update perceptual representations of 
ambiguous figures (Stöttinger et al., 2014).  
Functional neuroimaging in healthy individuals highlights similar brain regions to those 
lesioned in our two RBD groups. Paulus and colleagues (2005) used an event-related fMRI 
paradigm to explore the brain regions activated when participants played ‘rock, paper, scissors’, 
against a computer opponent. While prior studies have examined ‘rock, paper, scissors’ in the 
context of fMRI research, they have mainly focused on action and perception (Dinstein, Hasson, 
Rubin, & Heeger, 2007) or reinforcement signals (Kadota, Nakajima, Miyazaki, Sekiguchi, 
Kohno, & Kansaku, 2009; Vickery, Chun, & Lee, 2011) on a trial-by-trial basis. In contrast, 
Paulus and colleagues looked at both outcome and subsequent action selection processes 
following wins, ties, and losses. Results showed that the insula was activated primarily when 
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evaluating outcomes—particularly when the outcome was negative. Further, the STG became 
active primarily during play choice. The authors suggest that these areas are important for 
evaluating outcomes in the service of formulating a strategy.  
While the work of Paulus and colleagues highlights the role these areas play in a zero-
sum game, what remains to be seen is what role these areas play in adapting to a change in 
context requiring the updating of one’s model. Paulus and colleagues merely changed which 
strongly preferred play choice the computer tended towards over the course of their experiment 
(participants exploiting the preferred choice would win 90% of trials if played on every trial) 
rather than altering the weight of the bias over time. In our view, this limits the parameters of 
potential biases the participant must model and exploit, making the task akin to a set-shifting 
exercise, akin to the Wisconsin Card Sorting task (Buchsbaum, Greer, Chang, & Berman, 2005) 
which we showed in prior work was unrelated to deficits in exploiting an opponent’s bias in 
‘rock, paper, scissors’ (Danckert et al., 2012; Stöttinger et al., 2014). That is, once the fact that 
one choice yields success is discovered, all that remains is to determine whether the preferred 
choice (set) has shifted. Furthermore, while Paulus and colleagues focused on establishing the 
regions involved in each component of the decision making process on a trial-by-trial basis (e.g., 
feedback processing, action selection), the current study focuses on an overall network involved 
in modeling regularity over time relative to randomness. The current study also utilizes a more 
complex computer algorithm with multiple bias probabilities, such that participants playing the 
preferred choice would not always result in a high rate of success. Furthermore, the current study 
extends these findings to determine whether the relevant regions are sensitive to different types 
of bias (i.e., no-bias, heavily biased to one option, moderately biased towards two options). 
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In addition, the influence of reinforcement and rewards has not yet been explicitly 
examined in this context. Insofar as previous studies have examined the ability to update one’s 
model, participants also experienced greater rewards as their behavior changed. Thus, it may be 
possible that the experience of having received explicit rewards and the inference that a mental 
model has been updated may have been conflated (e.g., Paulus et al., 2005). It is conceivable that 
participants, whose behavior is taken as representing an updated mental model, are simply driven 
by transient changes in reward. For example, they may be changing strategy in response to 
seeking or securing increased wins as opposed to actually figuring out something new about their 
environment, with all the risk that following through on one’s beliefs entail. In the current study 
we attempted to decouple the reinforcement process from the responses that generate them. 
The current study employed a protocol adapted from Danckert and colleagues (2012) in 
which participants played rock, paper, scissors against a computer opponent that utilized a 
variety of strategies. The protocol was modified for fMRI in order to elucidate a network of areas 
that support the updating of an individual’s mental model as evidenced by behavioural 
exploitation of the shifting biases presented in the computer’s play. It was expected that 
individuals would demonstrate the ability to model and exploit the relatively simplistic computer 
stratagem and that exploration of neural activations under this context would reflect a network of 
right-hemisphere areas supporting the building and updating of mental models. 
 
2.2. Method 
Participants 
 Twelve (5 male; mean age = 29.9, SD = 5.2) neurologically healthy participants with no 
history of psychiatric or neurological illness participated in the experiment. Each participant 
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completed 5 experimental runs. Three of the 60 runs were excluded due to technical reasons. All 
participants had normal or corrected-to-normal visual acuity. All participants provided informed 
consent prior to participation and the research protocol was approved both by the Office for 
Research Ethics at the University of Waterloo and the Tri-Hospital Research Ethics Board of the 
Region of Waterloo in Ontario, Canada. Participants were given $20 remuneration for their 
involvement in the current study. 
 
Design 
 Participants played a zero-sum game of rock, paper, scissors. In this task, participants 
were to choose one of three options (i.e., rock, paper, or scissors) such that any chosen option 
could either beat the computer opponent, be beaten by the opponent, or tie the opponent. 
Participants were informed that the goal for each trial was to defeat the computer opponent’s 
choice.  
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Figure 2.1. Rock Paper Scissors Stimuli. Schematic representation of the experimental stimuli, 
display, and procedure that took place on each trial regardless of condition. Computer (top box) 
would choose first prompting user input. Trial results show computer and player’s choice in the 
top and bottom boxes, respectively. Box outline would change to green, red, or blue to depict 
trial win, loss, or tie, respectively.  
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Each trial began with a vertical array of two boxes; one above and below a fixation cross. 
Fixation was not strictly enforced. Participants were informed that the upper box represented the 
computer’s choice while the lower box represented their own choice. After 200 ms, the computer 
opponent’s selection box turned gray, indicating that the computer had made its choice and was 
awaiting the participant’s decision. Participants then indicated their choice by pressing one of 
three buttons on a response box. Immediately after participants made their choice the trial results 
would appear. Pictorial representations of the choices made were revealed in the upper and lower 
boxes for the computer and participant respectively (Figure 2.1). The outlines of the boxes, 
previously black, would change colour to green if the participant won, red if they lost, and blue 
for a tie. Each trial, in total, lasted 2500 ms. In the rare event that participants took longer than 2 
seconds to respond from the beginning of the trial, they would receive feedback that they were 
too slow by being shown both boxes with a gray interior and red outline instead of the typical 
trial result described above. This occurred infrequently (0.7% of all trials across all participants), 
and when slow responses did occur they were predominantly evident at the very beginning of the 
experiment (i.e., 64% of all slow responses occurred during the first epoch while participants 
became familiar with the time window with which they were required to respond). Only one 
participant had more than 1% of trials in which they responded too slowly (2%). 
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Figure 2.2. fMRI Run Conditions. Schematic representation of a single experimental run 
within the experimental protocol. Different epochs are denoted by the square wave and are 
labelled by the bias adopted by the computer opponent (with example ratios for each choice 
indicated where appropriate). Below this, possible player strategies for each condition and the 
anticipated outcomes corresponding to adherence with each respective strategy are shown (e.g., 
for the 70% bias if a participant chose rock 100% of the time this would lead to a 70% win rate). 
Optimal strategies are indicated in green while suboptimal strategies are depicted in red. 
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While the goal of each individual trial was to beat the computer opponent, the strategy of 
the computer was not stationary. Participants were not informed of this aspect of the task design. 
Throughout each experimental run the computer utilized five different strategies for a minimum 
of 30 trials (Figure 2.2). Paulus and colleagues (2005) demonstrated that 20 trials was sufficient 
to demonstrate learning of relatively simple biases, and reported much of the learning observed 
was found in the first 10 or so trials. Therefore, it was determined that 30 trials would allow 
ample opportunity to model the more complex computer behaviours while still getting sufficient 
data collected within a confined window of time. In order to set a behavioural baseline, as well 
as a functional control for subsequent contrasts, the computer started by playing randomly for 30 
trials (75s per run); whereby each of the three possible choices were played on one third of the 
trials (R, P, S: 33%, 33%, 33%). This was followed by a condition in which the computer ‘let’ 
the participant win for 30 trials by simply choosing the option that would be beaten by the 
participant’s choice on 70% of trials. This arbitrary win rate was intended to provide participants 
with positive reinforcement and increased wins relative to the random condition in a manner that 
did not require the participant to develop a model of the computer opponent’s tendencies by 
detecting and exploiting an observed bias in its play (i.e., strictly speaking, there was no 
observable bias). This allowed us to explore the question of whether merely winning at a certain 
rate would activate regions thought to be necessary for updating. This condition involved some 
level of deception in that participants were told prior to the experiment that when the computer’s 
choice square changed colour this meant that the choice had been “locked in” and would not 
change for the duration of that trial. While true for all other conditions, this arbitrary win rate 
condition involved the computer’s choice box changing colour prior to the participant choosing, 
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with the actual choice of the computer being made after the participant’s choice was entered to 
ensure the participant won on 70% of trials.  
From there, the computer began playing according to a specific bias, whereby it chose 
one option on 70% of trials, choosing each of the other two options 15% of the time (e.g., R, P, 
S: 15%, 70%, 15%) for a total of 60 trials (150 s per run).  
In order to evaluate participants’ ability to navigate more complex scenarios requiring 
mitigation of losses (as opposed to maximizing reward as in the 70% bias), the computer then 
switched to what we call a “two-bias” strategy for 30 trials; whereby the computer chose two 
options on a combined 90% of the trials (i.e., each respective option was chosen on 45% of 
trials), with a third option being chosen on only 10% of trials. This ‘two-bias’ structure 
continued the prior option favoured in the 70% bias albeit to a lesser degree (45% of trials vs. 
70%). The second bias of 45% was then chosen to defeat plays that would have been considered 
optimal under the 70% bias. For example, if the computer had previously been biased towards 
playing rock, thereby reinforcing increased play of paper, the computer would then play rock and 
scissors most often. If the participant continued to prefer paper choices – that is, the optimal play 
under the previous 70% bias structure – they would experience an increase in losses. However, if 
they were able to formulate a new model of the computer’s strategy, and act to minimize losses, 
they would switch to preferring rock; a strategy that would provide a similar amount of wins but 
fewer losses (i.e., more ties). To the extent that participants engaged in this change of strategy, 
their play could be considered optimal in that it minimized losses and maximized wins (Figure 
2.2). It is also important to note that participants, technically, could exhibit a suboptimal strategy 
whereby they experience primarily ties and losses (e.g., choosing scissors). As such, for each 
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permutation of the “two-bias” strategy that the computer could adopt, there was both an optimal 
and suboptimal strategy that participants could adopt. 
The computer then switched to 30 trials of a final two-bias strategy that, again, 
counteracted the previously optimal play strategy. As with the previous two-bias strategy, there 
was an optimal participant strategy (wins and ties) and a suboptimal strategy (ties and losses; 
Figure 2.2). This final condition enabled us to directly examine brain regions responsible for 
updating representations in order to mitigate or avoid losses by directly comparing each two-bias 
condition; whereas typical comparisons in behavioural decision making tasks focus on requiring 
participants to simply maximize rewards values. To prevent participants from merely 
memorizing the correct choice over the course of the five experimental runs, each run had the 
computer exhibit a bias towards a different set of choices than that of the previous run.  
 
fMRI data collection 
 Functional data were collected using T2*-weighted images collected on a 1.5 Tesla 
Phillips machine located at the Grand River Hospital medical imaging department in Waterloo, 
Ontario (TR = 2500 ms; TE = 40ms; slice thickness = 5mm with no gap; 26 slices/volume; FOV 
= 220 x 220 mm2; voxel size = 2.75 x 2.75 x 5mm3; flip angle = 90°). Each experimental run 
began and ended with 5 volumes of fixation. At the beginning of each session, a whole-brain T1-
weighted anatomical image was collected for each participant (TR = 7.5ms; TE = 3.4ms; voxel 
size = 1 x 1 x 1mm3; FOV = 240 x 240mm2; 150 slices with no gap; flip angle = 8°). 
Experimental stimuli were presented to participants in the magnet using an Avotec Silent 
Vision™ fibre-optic presentation system using binocular projection glasses (Model SV-7021). 
The experimental protocol was programmed using E-Prime experimental presentation software 
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(v1.1 SP3; Psychology Software Tools, Pittsburgh, PA). The onsets of trials were synchronized 
to each functional volume collection using trigger-pulses from the magnet. 
 
fMRI Data analysis 
 Functional imaging data were analyzed using Brain Voyager (v2.6, Brain Innovation 
B.V., Maastricht, Netherlands) with each participant’s low-resolution functional data aligned to 
their respective high-resolution anatomical image and subsequently transformed into Talairach 
space (Talairach & Tournoux, 1988). All functional runs were subject to trilinear interpolation to 
correct for motion artefacts. To determine whether significant motion occurred during any one 
run, pre- and post-correction images were compiled into a virtual movie that was played to look 
for instances of movement which would render the data inappropriate for the sample (Culham et 
al., 2003). No serious motion artefacts were present in the sample. All functional data were then 
pre-processed, including the use of linear trend removal and a spatial smoothing filter of 8mm 
FWHM. Predicted activations were convolved to the Boynton hemodynamic response function. 
For each run, linear predictors were applied corresponding to the timeline of the computer 
opponent’s strategy. The predictors were then entered into a General Linear Model where the 
significance for each voxel was evaluated as being significant below threshold of .001, which 
was below a False Discovery Rate threshold of .05. Additionally, a cluster size threshold of 20 
voxels was applied to each contrast. 
 To extract relevant areas of activation in the current study, seven contrasts were 
computed. First, to identify brain regions involved in exploiting a biased computer strategy, we 
contrasted the BOLD signal of the 70% frequency biased condition to the random condition. To 
investigate the role of non-contingent rewards on how individuals model their environment, we 
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contrasted the 70% arbitrary win condition to the random condition. To examine the brain 
regions involved in model building above and beyond non-contingent reinforcement, we 
contrasted the 70% bias condition to the 70% arbitrary win condition. To examine the regions 
sensitive to changes in potential loss rates we contrasted each two-bias condition to the random 
condition, independently. We also contrasted the second two-bias condition against the first to 
determine whether there were any additional areas preferentially involved in switching from one 
model to another. Finally, to investigate the possibility of difficulty-sensitive areas, we 
contrasted the two-biased and one-bias conditions. In all contrasts, significant regions of interest 
are reported with centroid co-ordinates, cluster size and peak t-scores. 
 
Behavioural Data Analysis 
In order to determine the neural regions supporting the building and updating of a mental 
model, it was first necessary to demonstrate that participants were indeed capable of building an 
accurate model in the first instance. To demonstrate this, participants’ play choices on each trial 
of the experiment were coded as being optimal, suboptimal, or neither. For example, if the 
computer was biased towards playing scissors, the optimal choice would be rock, suboptimal 
would be paper, and scissors would be neither. It was then possible to examine whether 
participants chose optimally above chance, and minimized suboptimal play, for each condition of 
the experiment. For conditions where no clear optimal choice was possible (i.e., random and 
arbitrary win conditions), participant’s modal choice during that epoch was tracked to determine 
how participants developed a preference for that particular play choice. Behavioural data were 
subjected to both linear and non-linear curve estimations regressed over each trial for each 
condition. The Durbin-Watson statistic was used to determine the extent to which these data 
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were auto-correlated. Examination of fit statistics suggested that a linear trend provided the best 
fit to these data under all conditions except for the two-bias conditions where a quadratic 
estimation provided significantly better fit.  
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2.3. Results 
 Examination of participant performance when playing against the 70% bias revealed 
proportions of optimal plays that were significantly above chance, t(11) = 7.89, SE = .03, p < 
.001. Further, participants simultaneously minimized suboptimal play choices such that the 
proportion of suboptimal play was significantly below chance, t(11) = 15.23, SE = .01, p < .001. 
Examination of the time course of participant’s ability to adapt to the computer’s strong bias 
revealed a significant trend whereby participants were capable of adapting to the biased 
computer strategy (Table 2.1), reaching probability matching thresholds of optimal play within 
the 30 trial window (Figure 2.3). Consequently, it can be inferred that participants successfully 
represented and exploited the bias in computer play choices (Figure 2.3).  
 
Table 2.1. Curve Estimation Statistics. 
 Linear Quadratic 
Condition blin Fit Fsig D-W blin bquad Fit Fsig 
Arbitrary Win Modal Choice .08 12.02 <.01 1.34 -.25 .35 12.14 <.001 
1-Bias Early .22  83.29 <.001 1.46 .87 -.66 42.69 <.001 
1-Bias Late .09 14.29 <.001 1.54 -.04 .14 8.18 <.001 
1-Bias Combined .22 168.97 <.001 1.49 .48 -.28 93.24 <.001  
2-Bias A .10 4.38 <.001 1.58 1.80 -1.70 27.46 <.001 
2-Bias B .03 1.32 .251 1.62 -2.96 2.99 21.19 <.001 
Linear and quadratic estimation statistics where participant play choices were regressed over the 
course of each experimental epoch. Arbitrary win condition play choice indicates the rate of 
frequency with which participants played their most common choice during that epoch over the 
course of the trials. Remaining conditions were analyzed using the frequency with which 
participants selected the most optimal choice for each trial of each condition. 
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Figure 2.3. Rock Paper Scissors Behavioural Data. Depicts the proportion of optimal choices across each experimental condition. 
For all but the superstitious condition, the optimal choice was the move that carried the best chance of an optimal result (Figure 2.2). 
The superstitious condition, where participants were guaranteed to win on 70% of the trials, did not have a particular bias that 
participants could exploit. Therefore, the modal choice for each participant throughout the condition was plotted over time. 
Performance within the shaded area indicates failure to reach probability-matching thresholds. Dashed red line depicts random chance 
threshold. Dashed blue lines about the curves indicate 95% confidence intervals.
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Contrasting the 70% bias condition against the random control condition revealed a 
network of activations including bilateral STG, right anterior insula, right inferior parietal lobule 
(IPL), and anterior cingulate cortex (ACC; Table 2.2). With respect to the 70% arbitrary win 
condition, the intent was to provide participants with reinforcement signals that were 
disconnected from the requirement to model and exploit the computer’s play. Ideally, 
participants would receive greater amounts of wins relative to the random condition, but would 
do so regardless of their own play strategy. A priori we assumed that participants would play 
randomly both in the random and arbitrary win-rate conditions. They did not. When playing in 
the 70% arbitrary win condition, participants played as if they had discovered a bias in the 
computer’s play and acted to exploit it. That is, rather than playing randomly, participants began 
to favour one option over another much as they did in the 70% bias condition (Figure 2.3). The 
play choice made most often by participants in this condition (i.e., the choice participants 
putatively believed would result in the most wins) was played significantly greater than chance, 
t(11) = 5.65, SE = .05, p < .001. Examining the time course of play (Figure 2.3) suggests that 
participants believed they had “discovered” a bias in play and began to prefer the option that 
would win at an increasing rate over time, such that they adopted a play choice that mimicked 
probability matching (Table 2.1; Figure 2.3). It is important to note that this is not merely a 
carry-over effect from the previous trials (i.e., the random condition). The play option that 
participants heavily favoured in the 70% win condition was played significantly more in that 
condition than it was in the previous random condition, t(11) = 4.82, SE = .05, p < .001. Further, 
participants’ preferred play option in the 70% win condition was not chosen at a greater-than-
chance rate in the previous random condition, t<1.  
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Given the similarities between participants’ performance in the non-contingent 70% win 
condition and how they performed when facing a computer that exhibited a true bias, it would 
not be altogether surprising to find similar areas of activation when computing a similar contrast. 
That is, in the 70% win condition participants played as if their opponent had adopted a 
frequency bias. Thus, when we contrasted the 70% win condition to the random control, we 
found a similar network of cortical areas including the right STG, right ACC, and right MFG 
(Table 2.2). Comparing the 70% win condition with the 70% bias condition yielded no 
significant activations. This finding is consistent with the behavioural data indicating that the 
participants treated the strategy played by the computer similarly in both conditions. 
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Table 2.2. Whole-brain GLM Activations for computed contrasts (p<.001). 
Contrasts Co-ordinates Activated Region(s)    
 X Y Z R/L Region BA Cluster Size Peak t-scorea 
1. 70% Bias > Random  60 -11 8 R STG 22 1483 5.77 
 54 -10 -11 R MTG 21 1029 4.55 
 45 -6 -27 R ITG 20 756 5.58 
 30 -42 53 R IPL 40 2548 6.62 
 34 -20 53 R PCG 4 3410 7.46 
 10 -46 56 R Precuneus 7 2115 5.35 
 9 -46 31 R PCC 31 2683 6.14 
 12 -1 -12 R Ventral striatum -- 687 5.45 
 42 -4 2 R Post. insula 13 3257 5.14 
 38 -9 14 R Ant. insula 13 1095 5.38 
 1 -13 41 R ACC 24 2384 5.66 
 25 21 -15 R OFC 47 2506 5.89 
 -15 0 -13 L Ventral striatum -- 1998 6.00 
 -8 -49 27 L Precuneus 31 4686 6.41 
 -3 -32 57 L SMA 5 1785 6.52 
 -57 -6 -9 L MTG 21 4931 8.22 
 -52 -55 24 L STG 22 3468 5.83 
2. 70% Win > Random  58 -12 1 R STG 22 4825 6.60 
 56 -34 4 R MTG 22 1875 5.6 
 27 -39 57 R IPL 40 1181 5.11 
 25 -30 61 R PCG 3 3858 5.92 
 1 -3 36 R ACC 24 3634 5.90 
 5 -50 28 R PCC 31 3574 5.86 
 7 14 6 R Caudate -- 1445 5.25 
 32 16 -13 R OFC 47 9514 7.03 
 0 61 7 R vmPFC 10 2872 6.38 
 6 45 39 R dmPFC 8 2094 4.77 
 10 7 -8 R Ventral striatum -- 4199 7.28 
 -52 -59 24 L TPJ 39 5490 7.83 
 -57 -12 -9 L MTG 21 7128 8.18 
 -17 0 -13 L Ventral striatum -- 2767 6.33 
 26 
 -40 23 -15 L OFC 47 953 5.06 
 -15 44 44 L dmPFC 8 1655 5.21 
 -5 -52 26 L PCC 31 7215 7.22 
 -19 -47 55 L Precuneus 7 651 5.24 
3. 70% Bias > 70% 
Win 
-- -- -- -- No activations -- -- -- 
4. 2-Bias (A) > 
Random  
-- -- -- -- No activations -- -- -- 
5. 2-Bias (B) > Random  -- -- -- -- No activations -- -- -- 
6. 2-Bias (B) > 2-Bias 
(A) 
43 -57 37 R  TPJ 39 4417 5.41 
 45 -45 38 R  IPL 40 3162 5.42 
 9 31 45 R  dmPFC 8 4332 5.86 
 37 15 46 R  dlPFC 8 2482 4.47 
 29 57 14 R  vmPFC 10 4533 6.53 
 48 21 -9 R  OFC 47 1950 5.50 
7. 2-Bias (A+B) > 70% 
Bias 
15 -18 7 R Thalamus -- 4588 6.80 
 50 -35 -11 R MTG 20 1929 6.22 
 43 -73 -13 R Fusiform Gyrus 19 1584 6.43 
 -28 41 14 L vmPFC 10 1553 5.21 
 -38 -44 38 L IPL 40 1622 5.14 
Rand, control condition where participant played against computer playing without bias towards any of the 
three choices. 70% Bias, condition where computer played one option on 70% of the trials, with each other 
choice being played 15% of the time. 70% Win, condition where computer rigged game to allow participant to 
win on 70% of trials regardless of their choice. Two-Bias A/B, conditions where computer was biased towards 
two of three options (45% of trials for each) such that sticking to previous optimal strategy would yield reduces 
success (i.e., wins, but increased losses). STG, superior temporal gyrus; STS, superior temporal sulcus; MTG, 
medial temporal gyrus; IPL, inferior parietal lobule; SMA, supplementary motor area; SMG, supramarginal area; 
ACC, anterior cingulate cortex; PCC, posterior cingulate cortex; PCG, precentral gyrus; MFG, medial frontal 
gyrus. 
a The peak t-statistic within a specific area of activation. All voxels within specified area surpass significance 
threshold of p<.001. 
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When participants played against the two-biased computer opponent, a strategy requiring a 
more complex representation factoring in an increased risk of losses, there was not a clear-cut 
choice that participants were able to arrive at. None of the three options would guarantee success 
on over half the trials, forcing participants to model the likelihood not only of winning but also 
of losing (or tying) with their opponent. Arguably then, the most optimal choice in these epochs 
would be the one that offers a greater chance at wins, while minimizing exposure to losses. 
Participants were successfully able to model the complex play of the opponent in these 
circumstances and chose the response that maximized wins while minimizing losses at a greater 
than chance level in both the first, t(11) = 3.75, SE = .02, p < .01, and second epochs, t(11) = 
7.07, SE = .02, p < .001. As with the other conditions, participants also avoided the worst 
possible choice and played it at a level significantly lower than chance in both the first, t(11) = 
14.03, SE = .02, p < .001, and second epochs, t(11) = 5.67, SE = .02, p < .001. Examining the 
time-course of participant responses also reveals a significant quadratic trend in their response 
style that reached probability matching thresholds by the end of the epoch on this more difficult 
task, consistent with what was observed in the other conditions (Table 2.1; Figure 2.3).  
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Figure 2.4. Whole-brain GLM Contrast Volume Maps. Significant regions activated when 
comparing the 70% bias vs random condition are depicted in blue, 70% win vs random condition 
in green, and 2-bias B vs 2-Bias A in red. 
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However, compared to the previous conditions, participants were not able to demonstrate 
consistent optimal play that persisted throughout the epoch as with the easier conditions. 
Examination of each respective 2-bias epoch shows that participants’ optimal play choice dipped 
significantly below random chance thresholds following the beginning of each epoch. Critically, 
participants’ optimal play fell below random chance thresholds at the end of the first 2-bias 
epoch, suggesting that they weren’t able to effectively exploit the computer’s strategy by the end 
of this difficult condition despite playing at above probability matching thresholds earlier. 
Conversely, participants optimal play choices were significantly above probability matching 
thresholds by the end of the later 2-bias condition, suggesting that participants needed additional 
experience with the more difficult computer strategy to learn its tendencies, but that with 
sufficient experience they were able to effectively exploit this bias. Given that participants did 
avoid the most obvious suboptimal choice (i.e., the choice that resulted in predominantly losses 
and ties), the variability in optimal play under the two-bias conditions most likely reflects pattern 
seeking, whereby participants knew what two options were best and sought out the right balance 
in which to play them for maximal success. 
As with the conditions involving higher win rates or stronger biases (i.e., 70% arbitrary 
win and 70% bias respectively), contrasting the second two-Bias condition with the first two-
biased condition revealed a similar network of right-hemisphere cortical areas including the TPJ, 
IPL, vmPFC, and dmPFC (Table 2.2; Figure 2.4). However, comparing each respective two-
biased condition against the random control yielded no significant activations. 
Given the relative heterogeneity of our conditions and the sparse pattern of activations 
throughout the explored contrasts, we submitted the dataset to a probability mapping procedure 
where we compared all contrasts that reflected behavioural evidence of modeling and exploiting 
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the computer’s bias. This procedure overlays all volume maps that show significant activations 
and displays activated regions common to all contrasts that reflect behavioural exploitation by 
participants. This allowed us to determine the most commonly activated areas during relevant 
behavioural change across all contrasts (Figure 2.5). 
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Figure 2.5. Probability Threshold Map. Depicts areas of significant overlap across conditions. 
Greater weighted activation probability signifies regions with shared voxels across a greater 
number of contrasts. 
 
 
 32 
 For the purpose of this analysis, we focused only on the arbitrary win condition, the 
70%-bias condition, and the second 2-bias condition as these were the only instances in which 
optimal play choice was significantly above probability matching thresholds by the end of the 
epoch (Figure 2.3). Probability mapping analysis revealed a predominantly right-hemisphere 
network of areas. Most notably among these are the parietal cortex, cingulate cortex, anterior 
insula, prefrontal cortex including vmPFC and dmPFC, and reward processing areas including 
the ventral striatum (see Balleine, Delgado, & Hikosaka, 2007 for review).  
 
2.4. Discussion 
Evidence of modeling bias in environmental regularity 
The current study examined the brain regions supporting the ability to build and update a 
mental model of an opponent’s bias in a zero-sum game. As predicted, and consistent with 
previous research (Danckert et al., 2012), participants were consistently able to model the shifts 
in their computer opponent’s play regardless of the complexity of the strategy. Participants 
consistently showed significantly greater proportions of optimal plays while simultaneously 
minimizing suboptimal plays, consistently reaching probability-matching thresholds by the 
conclusion of each respective condition. These behavioural results are consistent with previous 
research showing that individuals are capable of identifying the underlying distributions, and 
changes therein, of events over time despite the apparent noise and complexity of trial-to-trial 
events (Brown & Steyvers, 2009). Whereas some research has highlighted the capacity for shifts 
in models through explicit environmental cues (Green et al., 2010), the current results emphasize 
that individuals are capable of this despite the fact that no explicit cue or warning is given to 
foreshadow a fundamental change in their environment. 
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Examination of the neural correlates of this behavior focused on contrasting BOLD signal 
between conditions where participants played against a computer utilizing a biased strategy vs. a 
control where the computer played randomly. While individual areas may have differed 
somewhat based on particular contrasts, activations were generally observed in a predominantly 
right hemisphere network of areas including the rIPL, cingulate cortex, medial prefrontal cortex, 
and the insula.  
 
Contributions of right parietal cortex to evidence seeking and integration 
Previous research on the role of right parietal cortex have commonly suggested the area 
to be partially responsible for the allocation of attentional resources (Hopfinger, Buonocore, & 
Mangun, 2000), in line with work in neurological patients showing that damage to these areas 
results in failures of attentional orienting towards contralesional space (Ferber & Danckert, 2006; 
Heilman & Edward Valenstein, 2011; Mesulam, 1981). However, more recent evidence has 
begun to implicate right parietal areas such as the IPL, in higher order cognitive processes, such 
as the perception of causality (Straube, Wolk, & Chatterjee, 2011), decision making under 
uncertainty (Paulus, Hozack, Zauscher, McDowell, Frank, Brown, & Braff, 2001;Paulus, 
Feinstein, Tapert, & Liu, 2004), theory of mind and signaling empathic responses (Decety & 
Lamm, 2007; Geng & Vossel, 2013). The common thread through these discrete and disparate 
abilities appears to be less related to orienting attention than to making sense of what is being 
experienced to support appropriate goal-directed action. 
Furthermore, recent meta-analytic research suggests that areas surrounding the right 
temporoparietal junction (TPJ; namely IPL and STG) are more likely to be responsible for 
internal model updating rather than stimulus driven attention orientation as it is typically 
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regarded (Geng & Vossel, 2013; McGuire, Nassar, Gold, & Kable, 2014). This interpretation is 
consistent with work in our lab implicating the right hemisphere in impaired updating 
performance. Specifically, when given a similar rock, paper, scissors task, patients with right 
brain damage typically had greater difficulty modelling and exploiting the simple biases of the 
opponent relative to age-matched healthy controls (Danckert et al., 2012; Stöttinger et al., 2014).  
This conceptualization of TPJ functioning is also consistent with neuroimaging research 
on healthy participants that has also shown the right IPL to be preferentially activated during 
evidence seeking and exploration while completing probabilistic decision making tasks (Daw, 
O'Doherty, Dayan, Seymour, & Dolan, 2006; d'Acremont, Schultz, & Bossaerts, 2013; 
d'Acremont, Fornari, & Bossaerts, 2013; Furl & Averbeck, 2011). In addition, event-related 
fMRI evidence from Paulus and colleagues (2005) suggest that the right STG may be responsible 
for hypothesis space generation and strategy integration based on evaluating outcomes (Paulus et 
al., 2005). The activations of these two areas – namely the IPL and STG – in the current study 
lend further credence to the notion that they share a critical role in model building by seeking out 
and integrating evidence into a model over time. 
 
Cingulate cortex may signal the need to update 
Functional imaging research examining the role of anterior cingulate cortex has long 
suggested it to be partially responsible for error detection (Carter, Braver, Barch, Botvinick, & 
Noll, 1998). As errors occur or tasks become more difficult, suggesting error rates are likely to 
increase, it is typical to observe a rise in ACC activation (e.g., MacDonald, Cohen, Stenger, & 
Carter, 2000). However, recent research has begun to examine the role of the ACC from a 
different perspective. Increasingly, ACC activations have begun to be associated with errors in 
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“belief-based” decision making. In a recent study, Zhu and colleagues (2012) had participants 
play a competitive investment game where they were asked to bid from an endowment in order 
to win a larger prize, but would lose both their initial investment and the prize in the event their 
opponent outbid them (Zhu, Mathewson, & Hsu, 2012). It was possible to succeed in this task by 
adopting a purely reinforcement learning scheme; slowly determining the strategic payoff of 
different levels of investment based on prior outcomes. Conversely, players could adopt a belief-
based approach and actively attempt to model the aggressiveness or passivity of their opponent. 
Doing so would allow participants to rapidly predict the minimum investment necessary to win, 
resulting in much larger payoffs (i.e., the prize plus the extra endowment they did not need to 
invest in order to win). Critically, both of these approaches carried the possibility of experiencing 
errors in decision making. Results showed that ACC activation was higher when the errors were 
made whilst employing a belief-based decision making approach to the task, relative to a 
reinforcement learning approach. Further, ACC activations closely tracked individual differences 
in the level of engagement in the belief-based strategy. The authors concluded that the ACC 
could be better characterized as responsible for belief-based error signals, rather than merely 
error detection in the absence of a pre-existing model of the environment.  
Aside from simply error processing, research has also implicated the ACC in the process 
of updating, where volatility in the environment exists relative to prior stability such that 
individual trial outcomes, positive or negative, must be weighed against expected levels of 
uncertainty (Walton, Croxson, Behrens, Kennerley, & Rushworth, 2007; Woolrich et al., 2007). 
Furthermore, Behrens and colleagues (2007) suggest that the ACC is involved in the integration 
of trial-by-trial outcomes, rather than simply evaluating a single trial in isolation. Indeed, 
numerous studies demonstrate a compelling relationship between ACC activation and increased 
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learning rates (Woolrich et al., 2007; McGuire et al., 2014), suggesting that the ACC is partly 
responsible for signaling when additional hypotheses need to be explored or tested when the 
environment becomes more volatile compared to epochs of relative stability. Furthermore, 
posterior cingulate cortex also appears to play a significant role in change detection by keeping 
track of a cumulative learning rate in a complex environment, which may help to trigger a later 
shift in strategy as new evidence reaches a critical threshold for change (Pearson, Heilbronner, 
Barack, Hayden, & Platt, 2011). 
As it pertains to the current study, the presence of cingulate cortex activity in our sample 
may suggest that participants approached the task with the express purpose of modeling the 
behavior of the opponent; as the computer shifted strategies participants experienced belief-
based errors that triggered a re-evaluation of the computer’s strategy. Furthermore, under the 
context of a changing strategy, the cingulate cortex activation may reflect an integration of trial 
outcomes signaling the need to explore additional hypotheses once the play of the computer 
diverged from expected outcomes. 
 
Involvement of prefrontal cortex in model maintenance 
Activity within the medial prefrontal cortex and related PFC regions (specifically 
vmPFC, dmPFC, and dlPFC) has been consistently implicated in executive control functions 
(Geng, 2013; Hare, Camerer, & Rangel, 2009). More specifically, the medial prefrontal cortex 
(notably the vmPFC) are classically considered to be important for signaling the subjective 
reward value of stimuli and potential decisions in the context of ambiguity (Kable & Glimcher, 
2007; Hare et al., 2009; Rangel & Hare, 2010). This is consistent with lesion symptom mapping 
research implicating medial prefrontal cortex in reward and outcome valuation in the context of 
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reinforcement learning (Gläscher et al., 2012). Recent research has also implicated vmPFC 
functioning in monitoring the reliability of currently utilized strategies (Domenech & Koechlin, 
2015). Furthermore, prior research has shown that the ACC and insular cortex appear to 
modulate vmPFC activity during more complex decision making tasks where action costs and 
prospective rewards are not entirely clear (see Rangel & Hare, 2010 for review). Activity in the 
mPFC and ACC seen in the current study may reflect joint monitoring processes to maintain the 
application of an effective strategy for as long as it remains viable (Donoso, Collins, & Koechlin, 
2014).  
 
Role of insular cortex in balancing risk and reward 
Research on the role of the insula has consistently implicated this area in tasks that 
involve risky decision making that typically involves the potential for gains and losses 
(d’Acremont, Lu, Li, van der Linden, & Bechara, 2009; see Levin, Xue, Weller, Reimann, 
Lauriola, & Bechara, 2012 for a recent review). Research on the insula has also implicated it as a 
key component in probabilistic learning in conjunction with other areas that were activated in the 
current study (e.g., parietal cortex, dmPFC; McGuire et al., 2014). This seems reasonable given 
the broad spectrum of co-activation observed between insular cortex and cognitive processing 
areas and its involvement in numerous cognitive disorders (Uddin, 2014). Indeed, previous 
studies have implicated insular cortex at different stages of the decision making process through 
the use of event-related designs that titrate the components of risk analyses such as the 
anticipation of a risky decision (i.e., prospects for success; Furl & Averbeck, 2011), and in the 
evaluation of the outcome of a risky decision (Paulus et al., 2005). The results of the current 
study lend further evidence suggesting that the insula is involved in learning and adapting to 
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change through its conjunction with other regions to code subjective risk and reward values for 
maintaining a current set of behaviours.  
 
General conclusion 
While the areas mentioned above have been separately implicated in different cognitive 
processes, their combined presence in the current study implicates a broad network of areas 
subsuming important component processes critical to the development and updating of a mental 
model. Areas in the frontal and parietal cortices appear to co-operate in the exploration and 
accumulation of additional evidence in the environment, as well as integrating these experiences 
into a causal model. 
Once built, such a model is only effective as long as the predictions they inform hold 
true. As the model is tested against the environment, metrics that inform the system of the 
viability of the current model are persistently gathered. This may include iterative calculations of 
volatility and subjective ratings of risk and reward given the expected outcome of each decision 
involving prefrontal cortex and the ventral striatum (Table 2.2). However, as the environment 
changes, decisions made upon existing models begin to falter. As this continues, areas of 
cingulate cortex would signal that the prospects of success whilst maintaining the existing belief-
set become increasingly worse. Past some threshold that allows for some expected stochasticity 
in observations (Yu & Dayan, 2005), the existing model becomes invalid, which would signal 
the resumption of evidence seeking and information integration into a new and updated model.  
Although our data showed predominantly more right-hemisphere activation in terms of 
activated voxels, bilateral activations were also observed (e.g., STG, MTG, IPL, Precuneus). 
This is consistent with past research using split brain patients suggesting that the left hemisphere 
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does play a role in integrating the outcomes of previous events (Wolford, Miller, & Gazzaniga, 
2000). This suggestion is further bolstered by fMRI examinations of healthy individuals 
completing prediction tasks that also reveal similar left brain area involvement including the 
STG alongside right temporal and parietal areas (Miller, Valsangkar-Smyth, Newman, Dumont, 
& Wolford, 2005). Taken together with the findings of the current study, it is reasonable to 
suggest that areas in the left hemisphere also contribute to an interpretive process critical to 
building models of one’s environment. However, the specific nature of their contribution, aside 
from inferences that can be made by interpreting comparable activity in the right brain, has yet to 
be fully explored. 
It is important to consider the results of the current study in the context of its relatively 
limited sample size. While literature exploring sample size recommendations (Friston, 2012) 
suggest a sample size of 16 as appropriate, Ingre (2012) asserts that conservative statistical 
corrections and constraints serve to reduce uncertainty around observed effects in the context of 
relatively smaller sample sizes. To that end, the current study has employed multiple statistical 
constraints targeted to reduce uncertainty around observed effects. Namely, the current study 
employs the use of a contiguous voxel cluster threshold, spatial smoothing, and a relatively 
conservative statistical threshold of p<.001. Additionally, the results of the current study are 
considered in context with the existing literature and ongoing research in our lab. In addition to 
limitations around sample size, the discrete nature of these component processes, and the areas 
that support them, warrant further research to establish the precise context and order in which 
these activations occur. While the design of the current study was unsuitable to address this 
question, future research employing an event-related design might. Further, the nature of these 
areas and their purported responsibilities set out clear predictions for the impact of disruption to 
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these regions in the context of updating a mental model. Future research using transcranial 
magnetic stimulation (TMS) or transcranial direct current stimulation (tDCS) could potentially 
isolate more specifically the roles played by each region, and therefore corroborate their 
importance in the updating process. 
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Chapter 3: Working memory correlates of updating2. 
3.1. Introduction 
A great deal of research has examined the ubiquity with which humans model and adapt 
to regularities in their environment (Saffran et al., 1996, 1999, 2003; Turk-Browne et al, 2005, 
2008; Abla & Okanoya, 2009; Green et al., 2010; Tenenbaum et al., 2011; Griffiths & 
Tenenbaum, 2006; Jueptner et al., 1997; Mayr, 1996; de Gardelle & Summerfield, 2011; 
Albrecht, Scholl, & Chun, 2012; Fiser & Aslin, 2001; 2002). Accurately modelling such 
regularities has been shown to be important for a broad range of functions from visual and 
auditory learning, to language acquisition, motor control, and predictive decision making (Turk-
Browne et al, 2005; Green et al., 2010; Jueptner et al., 1997; Saffran et al., 1996; Danckert et al., 
2012; Tenenbaum et al., 2011). Critically, in order to construct accurate models of variable and 
incomplete data sets, we must be capable of integrating information across time (Brown & 
Steyvers, 2009). Results of Chapter 2 indicate a network of brain regions that are involved in the 
ability to build and update mental representations that include frontal, parietal, and subcortical 
areas including the anterior insula and cingulate cortex. 
While our prior work in the context of a zero-sum game shows that healthy individuals 
can indeed adapt to unannounced changes in an opponent’s play strategy (Chapter 2; Danckert et 
al., 2012; Stöttinger et al., 2014a, b), what we don’t know from this work, is how other cognitive 
mechanisms impact this ability. At minimum, playing ‘rock, paper, scissors’ involves attending 
to the current play (i.e., attentional resources) and its outcome (i.e., reward signals) over the 
course of at least some subset of prior plays (i.e., working memory resources; Baddeley, 1992; 
2 A version of this chapter has been published as Valadao, D. F., Anderson, B., & Danckert, J. (2015). 
Examining the influence of working memory on updating mental models. The Quarterly Journal of Experimental 
Psychology, 68(7), 1442-1456. It is reproduced here with permission. 
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Baddeley, 2003). With respect to the latter, in order to successfully exploit an opponent’s bias in 
‘rock, paper, scissors’ it would be imperative to maintain some subset of prior plays in working 
memory (WM) in order to detect the bias in the first instance, and, importantly for our current 
purposes, to detect any change in that bias over time.  
There is ample evidence to suggest that WM resources are involved in learning through 
persistent exposure to spatial regularities; as demonstrated by the poorer performance in 
contextual cuing tasks when a WM load is imposed (Chun & Jiang, 1998; Annac, Manginelli, 
Pollmann, Shi, Müller & Geyer, 2013; Manginelli, Langer, Klose & Pollmann, 2013; Travis, 
Mattingley & Dux, 2013). Furthermore, paradigms exploring the ability to detect abrupt, salient 
changes are commonly understood to tax WM resources (Rouder et al, 2011). It is not well 
known, however, what impact a WM load would have on the ability to represent changes to 
information that occur over a longer time scale (i.e., slowly evolving changes to environmental 
regularities). In addition, while previous studies have investigated the impact of WM loads on 
learning, further research is needed in order to determine the relationship between the nature of 
the WM load (e.g., spatial,  featural) and the resulting impact on our ability to detect changes in 
both congruent and incongruent environmental regularities. 
The current study explored the effects of WM on our ability to exploit regularities in 
stimulus properties and to adapt to changes in those regularities – in other words, to build and 
update mental models. We employed a dual task where participants had to predict either the 
upcoming location or shape of a target while simultaneously completing a WM task. Target 
locations and shapes (in separate experiments) were presented with above chance regularity 
along the dimension of interest (see Methods). For example, target locations were initially drawn 
from one quadrant of the screen for 20 trials before changing to a different quadrant. Working 
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memory was then manipulated focusing on either the location, colour or shape of targets using 
versions of the N-Back task. In this way we were able to manipulate the relevance of the 
contents of WM (spatial vs. featural; Luck & Vogel, 1997) to the prediction task. Changing the 
underlying distribution of events on the primary prediction task without notice allowed us to 
examine the interaction of WM and the ability to update representations of regularities. 
Specifically, we hypothesized that WM load would differentially impact performance on the 
prediction task dependent upon the congruence (or lack thereof) of the WM task with the 
demands of the prediction task. Directing WM resources towards the stimulus property that also 
contained some level of probabilistic regularity (e.g., doing a location based n-back task while 
predicting impending target locations), ought to improve the ability to detect that regularity and 
adapt to any changes. 
 
3.2. Experiment 1: Method 
Participants 
 A total of 97 University of Waterloo undergraduate students (33 Male; mean age 19.9, 
SD ± 2.7 years) completed the first experiment. All participants had normal or corrected to 
normal vision and were right-handed by self-report. Participants were instructed to use their right 
hand throughout the experiment. Informed consent was obtained prior to commencing the 
experiment and all procedures were approved by the University of Waterloo, Office of Research 
Ethics. 
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Apparatus 
 Stimuli were presented on a 19" NEC AccuSync 90 monitor with a resolution of 1024 by 
768 at a refresh rate of 60Hz using a GeForce 4 Mx440 graphics processing unit. Button 
responses were captured via a Cedrus RB-530 Response Pad. Pointing behaviour was captured 
using Elo Intellitouch touch screen capture technology. Stimuli were created using Adobe 
Photoshop CS5 and the experimental protocol was created and administered using E-Prime 1.1 
on Windows XP. 
 
Procedure 
 Participants were seated approximately 57cm from a touch screen display. The 
experiment began with a touch screen calibration task, both to ensure that the touch screen was 
calibrated to the participant's responses, and to habituate participants to the use of the touch 
screen. 
 Each experimental trial consisted of two parts – a spatial prediction component and a 
WM component. To generate the spatial prediction component of the trial, participants were first 
shown a target stimulus. After 1250-1500 msec the target disappeared and the screen changed 
colour. This signaled to the participant that they were to predict – by pointing on the touch screen 
– the location they thought the next target would appear (Figure 3.1). Of course, in early trials 
such predictions amount to guesswork. Unbeknown to the participant, target locations were 
drawn from a specific spatial distribution centered around one quadrant of the screen (SDx,y = 60 
pixels) allowing participants to develop a representation over time that would more accurately 
predict upcoming spatial locations. After 20 trials the distribution shifted to a different quadrant 
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of the screen, requiring participants to detect the change in probabilistic regularity of target 
locations and update their representation in order to optimize predictions. Participants were not 
informed of the probabilistic regularity of the target locations or the shift in those regularities. 
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Figure 3.1. Working Memory Prediction Stimuli. Top depicts a schematic of the spatial 
prediction task in Experiment 1. After a brief fixation cross, an object would appear somewhere 
on screen. Participants made a button press response relative to the specific WM load (i.e., 0-
back or 2-back) they were currently performing. The object would then disappear and the screen 
would change color to inform them of the accuracy of their button press response. This also 
acted as a cue for participants to touch the screen indicating their prediction for where the next 
object was most likely to appear.  
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While the first component of each trial examined how efficiently participants could 
predict (and update following a shift) a representation of the spatial locations of targets, the 
second component explored what impact, if any, WM had on their ability to complete this task. 
On each trial, participants completed a WM task with one of two load levels (2-back vs. 0-back), 
focusing on one of three specific stimulus properties: colour (red, green, blue, or yellow), shape 
(circle, square, star, or triangle), or location (the four quadrants of the screen; Figure 3.2). 
Participants completed six blocks of trials with each block consisting of one level of WM load (0 
or 2-back) for each target property (location, colour, shape). For this component, while the target 
stimulus was on screen, participants responded by pressing a button on the touch pad if the 
stimulus met a specific criterion. If the stimulus did not meet the criterion, they were to withhold 
their response and wait for the target to disappear. For the 0-back trials, participants responded if 
the object was a particular colour, shape, or appeared in a specified quadrant of the screen; the 
particular criterion varied across different blocks. For the 2-back WM trials, participants 
responded by pressing a button when the current stimulus matched the stimulus two trials ago for 
either shape, colour, or screen quadrant. Consistent with both levels of the WM load 
manipulation, the target criterion (i.e., shape, colour, location) was varied across blocks of trials, 
but remained consistent within each block. In designing the experiment, it was possible to 
include different levels of the N-back task to explore the differential impact of WM difficulty per 
se on detecting changes in regularity. However, our primary goal was to explore the effect of 
WM modality and its congruence with the prediction task on participants’ ability to adapt to 
changes in probabilistic regularity. We chose the 2-back for the WM load conditions as it 
provided an optimal balance of difficulty when combined with the spatial prediction task. That 
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is, we felt that a 1-back WM load would not be sufficiently difficult to expose differential 
influences of WM modality on detecting changes in regularities, whereas a 3-back load would be 
too difficult, leading all conditions to exhibit a floor effect.  The 0-back detection task was 
included as a dual-task control with no WM load. While it was possible to include additional 
levels of the n-back task, we chose to limit the number of conditions in the study to limit the 
length of the task to a manageable level to minimize the possibility that fatigue and low 
motivation could account for our results.  
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Figure 3.2. 2-Back Task. Depicts a schematic of the different working memory tasks. The tasks 
could focus participants on one of three features of the object (i.e., its location as depicted, or its 
color or shape) in each block of trials. Sample button press responses adjacent to the objects 
indicate the correct response for that object in that block of the experiment (the arrow indicates 
temporal order of target presentation). 
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After an initial practice phase consisting of 20 trials with both levels of the WM task, 
participants moved on to the experimental trials. At the beginning of each experimental block, 
participants were prompted as to which task they would be completing (e.g., 2-back; same 
shape). If participants responded correctly, the screen would turn green to indicate their button 
response was correct; the screen turned red for incorrect responses. Examination of WM 
performance across the current study indicates that participants were capable of completing the 
2-back task, with a mean accuracy of 76%. Notably, 2-back accuracy was somewhat lower in the 
location condition relative to colour and shape conditions for Experiments 1, F(2,288) = 103.2, 
MSE = .02, p<.001, and 2, F(2,69) = 5.05, MSE = .02, p<.01, but not Experiment 3, F(2,72) = 
2.29, MSE = .01, p = .11 (Figure 3.3). Irrespective of their performance on the WM component 
of the task, participants then had to predict the location of the next object by touching the screen 
to indicate their prediction. In other words, the spatial prediction task was constant across all 
variants of WM load and WM target type. 
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Figure 3.3. N-Back Task Accuracy. Depicts dual-task N-Back accuracy as a function of WM load across all experiments. 
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The experiment was performed within-participants and the order of blocks was 
counterbalanced across participants. We predicted that participants would perform better at the 
spatial prediction task when simultaneously completing a WM task that focused their attention 
on the information that was relevant to the statistical learning task (i.e., the location of the 
objects), as opposed to information that was irrelevant to the task (i.e., the stimulus colour or 
shape). 
 
Data Analysis 
Accuracy on the spatial prediction component of the task in Experiment 1 was computed 
by calculating the Euclidian distance between the participant’s prediction on each trial and the 
known mean of the distribution from which the objects were drawn (i.e., √𝑒𝑟𝑟𝑜𝑟𝑥2 + 𝑒𝑟𝑟𝑜𝑟𝑦2), 
also known as radial error). For the remaining two experiments, accuracy for shape prediction 
was characterized as a proportion of how often the participant correctly predicted the object most 
likely to appear on subsequent trials (optimal prediction).  
We first explored spatial prediction performance in the first 20 trials in each experimental 
block (i.e., prior to any change in the distribution of target locations) to establish a behavioural 
baseline from which it would be possible to evaluate how well participants were able to detect a 
change in the distribution of target locations. To do this we calculated the individual accuracy of 
each participant for the first 20 trials of each initial target distribution (Figure 3.1). Non-linear 
curves were then fitted to the data to investigate whether a significant improvement in prediction 
error was evident for the first distribution. A significant curve fit would demonstrate that 
participants had become more accurate in their predictions demonstrating some degree of 
learning of the spatial distribution of targets of the first distribution (i.e., over the first 20 trials). 
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Analysis of these data revealed that participants’ clearly altered their predictions to reflect the 
nature of the first distribution of targets in both the 0-back, b = 0.106, F = 21.92, p < .001, and 2-
back, b = 0.084, F = 13.67, p < .001, conditions (Figure 3.4). Having shown that participants 
accurately learned the first distribution we next explored the improvement in participants’ ability 
to detect the change in the distribution of target locations using the same measure of accuracy as 
described for the first distribution. This allowed us to quantify how well participants’ were able 
to update their representation of object locations as a function of different WM load conditions. 
All data were analyzed using SPSS Statistics version 20.  
 
3.3. Experiment 1: Results 
Analysis of prediction errors after the switch in target distributions indicated that 
individuals were capable of effectively detecting the change in regularity of target locations 
when no WM load was present (i.e., 0-back conditions; Figure 3.4). Inverse curve estimations 
showed significant learning in the 0-Back conditions when participants focused on the object’s 
location, b = 0.201, F = 81.70, p < .001, color, b = 0.072, F = 10.05, p < .01, and shape, b = 
0.065, F = 8.10, p < .01 (Figure 3.4). 
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Figure 3.4. Experiment 1 Location Prediction Data.  
A. Depicts improvement in radial prediction error (relative to known distribution means) for the 
first 20 trials prior to a switch in object location distribution as a function of concurrent WM load 
(i.e., 0-back in white, and 2-back in gray). B. Depicts best fitting curve estimations for change in 
radial prediction error after the switch of object location distribution occurred across all 
experimental conditions (i.e., trials 21-40). 
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Under the different WM loads (i.e., the 2-back conditions) participants only showed 
improvement in learning for the colour, b = 0.056, F = 6.02, p < .05, and shape, b = 0.053, F = 
5.60, p < .05, conditions (Figure 3.4). However, when the 2-back WM task shared the same 
property as the prediction task (i.e., target location) participants showed no significant 
improvement in prediction, b = 0.003, F = 0.01, p = .91, (Figure 3.4). Directly contrasting 
improvements in prediction across the 0-back and 2-back WM conditions showed a significant 
difference for the location task only, t(96) = 6.97, SE = 436.57, p < .001. That is, when focusing 
on location there was a strong learning trend in the 0-back condition that was rendered 
essentially flat in the 2-back condition (Figure 3.4). A graph depicting the raw prediction 
behavior of our sample from a subset of conditions in our dataset is shown in Figure 3.1. 
Visually, this shows a larger degree of overlap in prediction behaviour when the WM task 
targeted the object location, further suggesting some difficulty adapting to changes in 
distributions under congruent WM loads. Taken together, the above results suggest a significant 
effect of congruent WM load on learning the second distribution.
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Table 3.1. Inverse Learning Curve Estimation Statistics.  
 Distribution 1 b Fit Fsig  Distribution 2 b Fit Fsig 
Exp. 1 0-Back     0-Back    
 Combined .106 21.92 <.001  Location .201 81.70 <.001 
      Color .072 10.05 <.01 
      Shape .065 8.10 <.01 
 2-Back     2-Back    
 Combined .085 13.67 <.001  Location .003 0.01 .91 
      Color .056 6.02 <.05 
      Shape .053 5.60 <.05 
Exp. 2 0-Back     0-Back    
 Combined .103† 5.12 <.05  Location -.109 5.75 <.05 
      Color -.097 4.55 <.05 
      Shape -.127 7.87 <.01 
 2-Back     2-Back    
 Combined -.099 4.75 <.05  Location -.072 2.52 .11 
      Color -.094 4.27 <.05 
      Shape .035 0.56 .44 
Exp. 3 0-Back     0-Back    
 Combined -.158 12.79 <.001  Location -.161 13.30 <.001 
      Color -.129 8.40 <.01 
      Shape -.229 27.47 <.001 
 2-Back     2-Back    
 Combined .09† 4.09 <.05  Location -.101 5.16 <.05 
      Color .023 0.26 .61 
      Shape -.049 1.18 .28 
†Where indicated, inverse curve estimation did not provide good fit for these data. Therefore, 
linear estimation statistics, which provided a much better fit in these conditions, are provided. 
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3.4. Experiment 2: Introduction 
The first experiment demonstrated that a spatial WM load impairs the ability to update a 
representation of the spatial distribution of objects when that distribution changes. However, the 
nature of the distributions used was somewhat problematic. Specifically, to avoid having the 2-
back task be overly simple, we presented targets near the border of screen quadrants (Figure 3.1). 
That is, we felt that distributions clearly contained within a given quadrant would be too easy to 
represent. This significantly limited our ability to switch the distribution of object locations (i.e., 
the new distribution also had to have targets appearing close to quadrant borders). Therefore, 
while we did see a reduction in learning rate during the location-based WM load condition 
relative to its no WM load counterparts, it is possible that a ceiling effect accounted for this 
difference. It was therefore important to replicate our findings using a different distribution of 
object features that could be varied without being constrained by the nature of the WM task. For 
the remaining experiments, we used shape as the feature participants had to predict on each trial. 
Since objects can be represented in WM both in terms of spatial and featural components (Luck 
& Vogel, 1997), we expected to replicate our findings when we now explored featural 
processing. That is, we expected prediction performance for the second distribution of shapes to 
be worst when WM load also involved shape processing. 
 
3.5. Experiment 2: Method 
Participants 
 20 University of Waterloo undergraduate students participated in the second experiment 
(7 Male; mean age 20.6, SD +/- 2.1 years).  
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Procedure 
 The objectives, structure, and stimuli for Experiment 2 were identical to Experiment 1 
save for one key difference. Instead of predicting future target locations, participants were asked 
to predict the shape of upcoming targets and indicate their prediction on the touch pad. As with 
Experiment 1, in the first 20 trials, one shape was more likely to appear than the other shapes 
(e.g., squares appeared on 70% of trials, with every other shape appearing 10% of the time). 
After these first 20 trials, the most likely target object was changed unbeknown to participants 
(e.g., circles appeared on 70% of trials, with every other shape appearing 10% of the time). 
Accuracy was computed as a proportion of trials in which participants correctly identified the 
most likely future shape to be the one that was actually most likely to appear. Trial-by-trial 
accuracy for each participant was submitted to non-linear curve estimation to examine the 
relative improvement in prediction accuracy as a function of WM condition. Data on participants 
learning improvement as a function of working memory load were analyzed in the same manner 
as Experiment 1. 
 
3.6. Experiment 2: Results 
Analysis of learning the first distribution (see Experiment 1) revealed significantly 
improved prediction performance for targets in the first distribution over the first 20 trials in both 
the 0-back and 2-back conditions (Table 3.1). As with Experiment 1, under no WM load, 
improvement in shape prediction accuracy occurred for location, (b = -0.109, F = 5.75, p < .05), 
color, b = -0.097, F = 4.55, p < .05, and shape conditions, b = -0.127, F =7.87, p < .01, (Figure 
3.5). 
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Figure 3.5. Experiment 2 Shape Prediction Data.  
A. Depicts improvement in shape prediction accuracy for the first 20 trials prior to the switch in 
shape distribution as a function of concurrent WM load (i.e., 0-back in white, and 2-back in 
gray). B. Depicts best fitting curve estimations for change in shape prediction accuracy after the 
switch of object shape distribution occurred across all experimental conditions (i.e., trials 21-40).  
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Under the context of a WM load, participants demonstrated a significant amount of 
learning in the color condition, b = -0.094, F = 4.27, p < .05. However, participants showed no 
improvement in prediction accuracy when the WM task focused on the object’s location, b =       
-0.072, F = 2.52, p = .11 or its shape, b = 0.035, F = 0.56, p = .44 (Figure 3.5). Critically, the 
largest difference in learning curves was observed when comparing the 2-back and 0-back 
conditions that focused on the target feature congruent with the prediction task (i.e., shape). As 
with Experiment 1 (i.e., location), these data indicate a significantly impaired ability to detect 
changes in regularity of object shapes when a congruent WM load (i.e., shape) was applied, t(19) 
= 2.53, SE = 4.63, p < .05. 
 
3.7. Experiment 3: Introduction 
 To keep Experiment 2 procedurally similar to Experiment 1 we continued to vary the 
spatial location of targets as we had in Experiment 1 (Figure 3.1). That is, not only did the task 
include regularity in the shape information of successive targets, there was also redundant 
regularity in the spatial information conveyed by successive targets (i.e., not only were targets 
more predictably of one shape or another, they were also more likely to appear in one quadrant 
or another). Given that we have shown previously that redundant spatial regularities can aid 
updating of mental models (Filipowicz et al., 2014), we felt it was important to examine shape 
prediction performance with spatially redundant regularities removed from the task. This was 
also considered important in light of prior research showing that WM load is decreased by 
redundancy and regularity (Brady et al., 2009). Therefore, we conducted an experiment in which 
the most likely shape appeared 70% of the time as in Experiment 2, but with locations of target 
objects drawn at random from all possible locations. 
 61 
3.8. Experiment 3: Method 
Participants 
 20 University of Waterloo undergraduate students participated in the third experiment (2 
Male; mean age 19.8, SD +/- 1.1 years).  
 
3.9. Experiment 3: Results 
Analysis of learning the first distribution (see Experiment 1) showed significant 
improvement in the first 20 trials (Table 3.1), indicating that participants improved their 
prediction performance for targets in the first distribution over the first 20 trials. Consistent with 
the first two experiments, participants demonstrated the ability to effectively detect changes in 
the regularity of object shapes after an unannounced shift in the most likely shape occurred. This 
was true regardless of whether the 0-back task focused participants on location, b = -0.161, F = 
13.30, p < .001, color, b = -0.129, F = 8.40, p < .01, or shape, b = -0.229, F = 27.47, p < .001 
(Figure 3.6). 
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Figure 3.6. Experiment 3 Shape Prediction Data.  
A. Depicts improvement in shape prediction accuracy for the first 20 trials prior to the switch in 
shape distribution as a function of concurrent WM load (i.e., 0-back in white, and 2-back in 
gray). B. Depicts best fitting curve estimations for change in shape prediction accuracy after the 
switch of object shape distribution occurred across all experimental conditions (i.e., trials 21-40).  
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Under a modest WM load, we see learning demonstrated only in the location condition, b 
= -0.101, F = 5.16, p < .05. However, participants demonstrated no learning under the color, b = 
0.023, F = 0.26, p = .61 and shape WM conditions, b = -0.049, F = 1.18, p = .28 (Figure 3.6). 
Furthermore, consistent with the first two experiments, we again demonstrate a significant 
impairment in shape prediction improvement when resources are focused on a congruent WM 
task (i.e., 2-Back shape) relative to its no-load control condition, t(19) = 2.87, SE = 4.54, p < .01. 
As with previous experiments, we see a marked decrease in learning the new most likely 
shape after the shift when WM resources were focused on the object’s location, b = -0.101, F = 
5.16, p < .05, color, b = 0.023, F = 0.26, p = .61, or shape, b = -0.049, F = 1.18, p = .28 (Figure 
3.6), relative to the 0-back conditions that placed no WM load on participants. Indeed, 
comparing learning curves directly indicate that participants are significantly poorer at 
improving prediction accuracy when WM was focused on features congruent with the prediction 
task (i.e., shape), t(19) = 2.87, SE = 4.54, p < .01. 
 
3.10. Discussion 
Results of the current study indicate that WM moderates the efficiency with which 
participants were able to detect and exploit a change in the regularity of their environment – in 
other words, updating a mental model. The reduced capacity for detecting change under a 
moderate WM load was modality specific. All experiments showed a consistent interaction 
between WM content and prediction performance such that a WM load that was congruent with 
the content of the prediction task was most detrimental to the ability to represent changes to 
regularities in the prediction task.  
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The purpose of mental models is to optimize predictive behavioural control given 
incomplete and noisy inputs (Howhy, 2012). The success of any given mental model depends on 
the predictive accuracy of the model. When a model’s predictions cease to lead to optimal 
behavioural outcomes we need to either fine tune the model given new information, or abandon 
it altogether in favour of a new model. The determination of the accuracy of a mental model 
depends on a process of comparing current observations with expected, or predicted outcomes 
generated by the model. What the current data suggest is that this comparative process to 
determine the efficacy of a mental model requires free WM resources. While we expected that 
focusing WM resources on the same property in which a change in regularities was to be 
detected would be beneficial to updating, the data showed the opposite. It was as if participants 
could not see the forest for the trees. Focusing on single instances for the purposes of the WM 
task obscured the ability to detect trends evolving over longer time scales (i.e., 20 trials; Figure 
3.4).  
 The current results concur with other research showing that WM loads interfere with our 
ability to attend to regularities (Annac et al., 2013; Manginelli et al., 2013; Travis et al., 2013). 
and detect salient changes (Rouder et al., 2011). Indeed, prior research has shown that individual 
WM capacity correlates with the capacity to learn sequences (Unsworth & Engle, 2005). Here 
we have extended these findings in three important ways. First, as discussed above, WM load 
interferes with the ability to detect slowly evolving changes (i.e., prior work examined only the 
influence of WM on detecting singleton events; Rouder et al., 2011) or repeated exposures to 
identical spatial configurations of stimuli (Annac et al., 2013; Manginelli et al., 2013; Travis et 
al., 2013). Second, the current results show that the influence of WM on detecting changes to 
regularities was modality specific (Figure 3.4). Specifically, prediction performance was only 
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disrupted when the WM task shared the same feature as the prediction task (e.g., remembering 
shape while predicting future shapes). Prior work has focused primarily on the impediment of 
spatial/configural learning due to spatial (but not featural) WM loads. Finally, the n-back nature 
of the WM manipulation in the current study resulted in a persistent and maintained use of WM 
resources across learning trials, whereas the WM loads of previous tasks did not have this 
maintenance built in to their manipulation. Interestingly, prediction performance while 
completing the two-back and the zero-back memory control tasks was similar when the features 
of the objects participants were required to remember differed from the target feature being 
predicted. This result may also suggest that the regularity in stimuli may have eased WM 
demands under certain circumstances, corroborating the notion that probabilistic regularity 
allows for compression of WM resources (Brady et al., 2009). 
In summary, the current study examined the relationship between working memory and 
the ability to detect changes in the environment in order to update an existing mental model. 
Results indicated that free WM resources are needed to effectively appreciate statistical 
regularities (i.e., increased efficiency under no-load conditions) and that modality specific WM 
tasks hindered the ability to detect changes in statistical regularities. These results establish at 
least one cognitive constraint acting on our ability to accurately represent regularities in the 
environment and changes to those regularities. 
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Chapter 4: Attentional Influences on Building and Updating Mental Representations 
4.1. Introduction 
Chapter 2, examining the brain regions involved in building and updating mental models, 
highlighted an important role for parietal cortex during instances where individuals successfully 
modeled and exploited biases in a computer’s play strategy. Notably, parietal cortex is typically 
considered important in governing the allocation of attentional resources (Wojciulik & 
Kanwisher, 1999; Hopfinger et al., 2000; Ferber & Danckert, 2006; Heilman & Valenstein, 
2011) and decision making processes (Straube et al., 2011, Paulus et al, 2004). Despite these 
findings, the role attention plays in facilitating the model building process is relatively unknown. 
Indeed, attention is a natural candidate for further exploration on its own merits. 
Attention is commonly understood as an important mechanism for facilitating information 
processing by selecting or orienting to relevant or salient information in the environment 
(Corbetta & Shulman, 2002). Attention can be oriented both volitionally towards goal-relevant 
stimuli in accordance with expectations (i.e., endogenous cueing; Posner, Snyder & Davidson, 
1980) or can be captured by salient events in the environment (i.e., exogenous cues; Müller & 
Rabbitt, 1989; Yantis & Jonides, 1990). However, additional research has begun to demonstrate 
that attention can be oriented not just by the presence of visually salient stimuli, but by visual 
and temporal regularities in the environment. 
Indeed, there are a number of studies that demonstrate a relationship between visual or 
statistical regularities and attentional biases. Zhao and colleagues (2013) demonstrated that the 
presence of statistical regularities in visual stimuli biased the allocation of attention such that 
participants were quicker to correctly identify search targets interleaved within structured vs. 
random arrays of objects (temporal regularities within streams of objects provided the 
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‘structure’; Zhao, Al-Aidroos, and Turk-Browne, 2013). This is consistent with other research 
which demonstrates that probabilistic regularity in the visual environment enhances the 
allocation of attention in visual search tasks such that frequently repeated search scenes lead to 
much faster identification and classification of target orientations (e.g., contextual cueing; Chun 
& Jiang, 1998; Geng & Behrmann, 2002; Rausei, Makovski, and Jiang, 2007; Jiang, Swallow, 
and Rosenbaum, 2012; Jiang, Swallow, Won, Cistera, and Rosenbaum, 2015). Additionally, 
regularity in the spatial or temporal presentations of visual stimuli has been shown to facilitate 
perceptual classification tasks (Druker & Anderson, 2010; Shaqiri & Anderson, 2012) and 
associative prediction tasks (Turk-Browne, Scholl, Johnson, and Chun, 2010). 
Taken together, this research clearly demonstrates that the presence of probabilistic visual 
regularities in the environment affects the allocation of attention. However, it is unclear whether 
the relationship works in the opposite direction. Namely, whether the explicit allocation of 
attention can improve one’s ability to build a mental representation of the regularities they 
observe. For example, while some suggest that attentional resources are a critical component of 
learning processes such as sequence learning (Nissen & Bullemer, 1987; Kabata, Yokoyama, 
Noguchi, and Kita, 2014), more recent research has demonstrated that sequences can be learned 
equally well in the context of impoverished attention resources (through the use of a dual task) as 
they can be in circumstances allowing full allocation of attentional resources (i.e., no dual task; 
Stadler, 1995). The influence of attention on statistical learning is equally controversial. 
Classically defined as the ability to passively observe probabilistic regularities between events, 
statistical learning is seen as a critical component of early lexical segmentation in the 
development of human language (Aslin, Saffran, and Newport, 1998; Saffran, Johnson, Aslin, 
and Newport, 1999). While Saffran and colleagues argue that such learning can occur without 
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explicit awareness of the translational probabilities, such as when they had individuals listen to 
streams of speech while completing a distractor task (Saffran, Newport, Aslin, Tunick, & 
Barrueco, 1997), others argue that such statistical learning is impossible without freeing up 
attentional resources.  For example, Toro and colleagues had participants either listen to speech 
streams with predictable translational probabilities in isolation or, in one instance, complete a 
detection task while listening to the same speech stream (i.e., responding to repetitions; Toro, 
Sinnet, and Soto-Faraco, 2005). In all cases, participants performed worse at the statistical 
learning task under the context of depleted attentional resources. However, in a similar study, 
Turk-Browne and colleagues presented participants with streams of visual shapes that formed 
regular triplets, with two groups corresponding to distinct colours. Participants viewed these 
groups of shapes interleaved by colour and were asked to detect repetitions of green shapes 
(thereby forcing participants to focus on only one colour of shapes). Results showed significantly 
increased learning of the triplet organization of attended relative to unattended shapes, again 
indicating that attention affects statistical learning (Turk-Browne, Jungé, and Scholl, 2005). 
What the above discussion highlights is that there remains some controversy concerning 
the influence of attention on our ability to represent regularities in the environment (i.e., build 
mental models). Importantly, none of these studies explored the influence of attention on 
updating mental representations when regularities change. While some argue that mere exposure 
to statistical regularity in the environment is sufficient, others demonstrate that directing 
attentional resources can have either a facilitative (Turk-Brown et al., 2005) or deleterious (Toro 
et al., 2005) effect on the learning process. Furthermore, to the extent that attention is an 
important component of the ability to build mental representations, it is unknown whether 
volitionally allocating attention will improve the model building process or whether attention 
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serves as a gating mechanism such that attentional constraints impair the process (Mangun, 1995; 
Fischer & Whitney, 2012). The purpose of the current study was to explore the role of attentional 
resource allocation on the ability to build a mental representation of visual regularity in one’s 
environment.  
 
4.2. Experiment 1: Introduction 
In order to examine the influence of attention on model building, it was first necessary to 
establish that participants could indeed represent two conflicting data constructs simultaneously. 
Therefore, the first experiment served as a behavioural baseline and proof of concept to establish 
our experimental protocol and explore the possibility that participants could later benefit above a 
known baseline of performance when they are eventually asked to allocate attention to one 
aspect of the environment over another.  
 
4.3. Experiment 1: Method 
Participants 
A total of 26 undergraduate students (M = 22.2 years, SD = 3.6 years) from the 
University of Waterloo participated in the current experiment. All participants reported normal 
or corrected-to-normal vision and gave written consent to participation. As remuneration for 
their involvement, participants received credit towards one of their Psychology courses that term. 
The experiment and all procedures were approved by the University of Waterloo, Office of 
Research Ethics. 
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Apparatus 
Stimuli were presented on a 19” monitor with a resolution of 1024 by 768 at 60Hz. 
Participants used a mouse to input their responses throughout the task. The task itself was created 
using Psychopy, a superset of the python programming language developed for the purpose of 
creating experimental stimuli and was administered on a computer running XFCE Linux (Peirce, 
2007). 
 
Procedure 
The experimental stimuli consisted of a visual analogue of the “Plinko” game featured on 
the commonly known daytime TV game show “The Price is Right.” Participants would observe a 
coloured ball fall from the top of the screen through an array of pegs before falling into one of 
the 40 slots at the bottom of the screen (Filipowicz, Valadao, Anderson, & Danckert, 2014; 
Figure 4.1). While the nature of the experimental protocol imparted a sense of randomness to the 
eventual destination of each ball, the eventual landing spot of each ball was pre-ordained to 
conform to a canonical distribution that was created prior to the experimental run. These 
distributions had a known mean and variance and created an array of eventual landing slots for 
the experiment. In the original iteration of the Plinko task, participants would first indicate their 
“prior” by drawing what they thought the distribution would look like before observing ball 
drops. Afterwards, participants would observe a single distribution of ball drops while making 
estimations on every trial as to what their internal model of the true distribution looked like 
(Figure 4.1). For the purpose of this chapter, the original task was extended to include two 
distributions. Participants always saw ball drops conforming to two source distributions grouped 
by colour (red and green balls). In the current experiment, ball drops were interleaved such that 
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only one ball (and hence only one colour) was dropped on each trial. Participants were asked to 
pay attention to both colours of balls equally as they fell so as not to impart any advantageous 
use of attention at this time. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4.1. Original Plinko Task. Participants observed balls dropping from the top of the 
screen through an array of virtual pegs into one of 40 landing slots. Participants were free to 
estimate their representation of the ball drops on each trial (but could also choose to leave their 
estimate unchanged from trial to trial).
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The primary objective of each experimental run was for participants to observe these ball 
drops and, at 35 trial intervals, input their estimations of what the true distributions looked like. 
This lead to a total of 4 estimates for each distribution in each condition and marked a change 
from prior iterations of this task where participants were free to adjust their estimations on every 
trial. The change was deemed necessary to ensure exposure to many more ball drops in a shorter 
time span than would be possible if they were stopped to input data every trial. Participants 
completed this task by allocating a height to each of the 40 bars underneath the landing spots on 
the Plinko stimuli such that the respective heights of each bar would form their internal model of 
the distribution. That is, a taller bar represented a higher probability of balls falling there, a 
smaller bar represented a lower expected probability and no bar at all indicated that participants 
thought balls would never fall in that slot. As in all experiments in the current chapter, 
participants were asked to estimate both the red and green distributions (Figure 4.2). Participants 
would be prompted to input their estimate for the appropriate colour distribution with a coloured 
text prompt at the bottom of the screen. Additionally, the bars themselves were coloured so that 
participants knew which distribution they were estimating at all times (Figure 4.2). Whenever the 
program paused to prompt participants for data, they were given prompts for both the red and 
green distribution, with the order in which those prompts were given randomized.   
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Figure 4.2. Experiment 1 Plinko Task. After observing alternating ball drops according to a 
red and a green distribution for 35 trials, participants would draw what they thought both red and 
green distributions looked like when prompted.  
 
Each run of the experiment consisted of four pairs of distributions (i.e., red and green in 
each pair). The distributions themselves, from which ball drop landing positions were drawn, 
were pre-generated during the design phase and were split into two conditions. The first 
condition consisted of distribution pairs in which the means for each distribution were separated 
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from each other by 0.5SD, 1.0SD, and 1.5SDs, including a final pair that shared the same mean 
but different variance (i.e., wide v narrow Gaussians). The second condition consisted of 
distribution pairs that overlapped with each other by 22%, 44%, and 66%, followed by a final 
pair that shared the same mean but difference variance (i.e., the same wide v narrow Gaussian 
pair as the other condition). The purpose of these two conditions was to determine whether 
participants’ capacity to represent each individual distribution differed as a function of the 
degree of similarity and whether any such differences could be addressed by allocation of 
attentional resources in subsequent experiments. The two distinct conditions were administered 
between subjects, while distribution pairs for each condition were counter-balanced within-
subjects. 
 
Data Analysis 
 Participants’ data were first pre-processed to normalize the height of their bar estimations 
in each given slot to a percentage of the sum total of their bar heights across all slots. This was 
necessary to ensure that the relative heights of the bars were equal across participants, preventing 
individuals who had a tendency to give all bars a stereotyped baseline height a disproportionate 
amount of bias on the data relative to an individual who left bar heights relatively low. This same 
normalization process was done for the source distributions such that each of the 40 slots had a 
percentage for the participants estimate (P.Sloti) and the true percentage of ball drops coming 
from the source distribution (D.Sloti). 
 From there, participant’s accuracy for estimating the source distribution was computed 
according to the following formula which sums the lower of the two percentages of each slot. 
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40
𝑖=1
 
 
This creates an accuracy value that penalizes relative under- and over-estimation of the source 
distribution across each slot, such that a value of 0 would be returned if the participant made 
absolutely no slot estimates in a region where the distribution existed and would approach a 
value of 1 as a participant’s slot estimates began to match the exact distribution slot percentages 
(Figure 4.3). 
 
 
Figure 4.3. Accuracy Estimation Example. Participant’s estimates are depicted by solid bars 
while source distribution is depicted by a transparent white curve. Accuracy is calculated 
according to the minimum overlap between the two curves and then converted into a percentage 
of the source distribution’s surface area. A maximum accuracy score is only achievable by 
precisely estimating both the mean and variance of the source distribution. Left depicts an 
example of overestimation that would reduce overall accuracy while the right depicts an 
underestimation error.
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Participant’s accuracy for each of the eight distributions (i.e., four pairs of red and green 
distributions) were averaged across all four trials where they made their respective estimates 
(i.e., participants made 4 estimates approximately every 35 trials for each of the red and green 
distributions under each condition). These accuracy scores were then entered into a General 
Linear Model to examine the effect of distribution pairs on how well individuals were able to 
accurately estimate the source distributions. All data were analyzed using SPSS Statistics version 
20. 
 
4.4. Experiment 1: Results 
Analysis of participant’s overall accuracy revealed a main effect of distribution, 
F(2.2,53.24) = 7.17, MSE = .02, p < .01, colour, F(1,24) = 5.29, MSE = .01, p < .05, a 
distribution by colour interaction, F(3,72) = 8.70, MSE = .004, p < .001, and a distribution by 
colour by condition interaction, F(3,72) = 4.69, MSE = .004, p < .01 (Figure 4.4). However, 
follow-up analyses demonstrated that much of these effects were driven by the fourth 
distribution pair that both groups of participants observed. Namely, the distribution that features 
a wide Gaussian (green) overlapping with a narrow Gaussian (red) sharing the same mean.  
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Figure 4.4. Experiment 1 Estimation Accuracy. Depicts distribution estimation accuracy for 
each distribution pair. Left panel shows performance for the distance condition pairs while the 
right panel shows performance in the overlap condition. Lines are coloured according to the 
distribution that was estimated by the participant. For this experiment the green distribution in 
the wide/narrow pairing was always wide while the red distribution was always narrow. 
 
Examination of accuracy estimates for this distribution pair revealed an overall reduction 
in accuracy for this final distribution pair relative to the three pairs that did not share the same 
mean, F(1,24) = 14.04, MSE = .02, p < .001. Furthermore, comparing the two distributions 
directly revealed that participants tended to perform worse at estimating the narrow (red) 
distribution relative to the wide (green) distribution, t(24) = 3.83, SE = .02, p < .01 (Figure 4.4), 
mistakenly estimating it as being much wider than it actually was. This suggests that participants 
tended to over-generalize their representation of variability to match the widest distribution 
observed at any given time. This is also consistent with other work in our lab demonstrating that 
participants have particular trouble transitioning from representing wide distributions to narrower 
distributions (Filipowicz, Valadao, Anderson, & Danckert, under review). 
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Figure 4.5. Experiment 1 Estimation Accuracy by Condition. Depicts distribution estimation 
accuracy as a function of distribution pair condition. Distance condition had distribution pairs at 
0.5SD, 1.0SD, and 1.5SD apart for distributions 1, 2, and 3, respectively. Overlap condition had 
distributions overlapping at 26%, 44%, and 66% for distributions 1, 2, and 3, respectively. 
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Indeed, when excluding this distribution pair, both main effects of colour, (F<1) and 
distribution, F(1.5,35.5) = 2.26, MSE = .01, p = .13, disappear, indicating that the uniquely 
difficult fourth distribution pair was driving these effects. In terms of between subject 
comparisons, while participants tended to estimate distributions more poorly when they were 
closer together (the overlapping condition, Figure 4.5), this difference did not reach statistical 
significance in the current experiment, F(1,24) = 2.28, MSE = .06, p = .14. 
 
4.5. Experiment 1: Discussion 
 In summary, results of Experiment 1 demonstrate that, without biasing the allocation of 
attention towards either of the two distributions, participants were able to estimate both with 
equal accuracy. While there was some indication that participants did more poorly overall when 
distributions overlapped with each other, this effect did not reach statistical significance. 
However, participants did particularly poorly at estimating a narrow distribution when presented 
in tandem with an overlapping wider distribution, a result that is consistent with prior work in 
our lab demonstrating difficulty in representing narrow distributions after first being presented 
with a wider distribution (i.e., this work showed each distribution sequentially as opposed to the 
interwoven presentation used here). 
 
4.6. Experiment 2: Introduction 
Given that the prior experiment demonstrated individuals were able to estimate two 
distributions simultaneously reasonably well, the central question of the current study was to 
explore whether or not the allocation of attention would improve an individual’s ability to model 
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their environment. The second experiment set out to test this hypothesis by examining 
performance in estimating two distributions while informally allocating attention preferentially 
towards one of them. 
 
4.7. Experiment 2: Method 
Participants 
 A total of 30 undergraduate students (M = 19.0 years, SD = 1.3 years, 12 male) from the 
University of Waterloo participated in the current experiment. All participants reported normal 
or corrected-to-normal vision and gave written consent to participation. As remuneration for 
their involvement, participants received bonus grade credit towards one of their Psychology 
courses that term. The experiment and all procedures were approved by the University of 
Waterloo, Office of Research Ethics. 
 
Procedure 
In contrast to the first experiment in which participants were asked to focus on both 
colours of ball drops, participants were now asked to attend only to the green ball drops, despite 
the fact that they’d later be asked to estimate distributions of both colours, a fact participants 
were informed of at the outset. This would allow for the exploration of the impact of selective 
attention on how well individuals represent regularities.  
Despite our request to participants that they focus only on green ball drops, we did not 
implement a mechanism in the current experiment to strictly enforce allocation of attention. 
However, one critical change made to the current experiment was in relation to how the balls fell 
into the landing slots. Given that the prior experiment displayed ball drops one at a time, it was 
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possible that, under the current instructions, participants would be able to shift their focus 
between distributions as interleaved trials of red and green ball drops were presented. Therefore, 
the current experiment displayed both red and green ball drops at approximately the same time. 
To accomplish this, a modification to the Plinko task rendered two ball drops, one of each 
colour, falling through the pegs at roughly the same time. A temporal jitter was implemented 
such that pairs of balls never landed at the same time (Figure 4.6).  Participants observed the 
same distribution pairs as in Experiment 1. Each trial consisted of the presentation of one green 
and red ball, with data being collected at trials 17, 35, 53, and 70.
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Figure 4.6. Simultaneous Plinko Task. Depicts a version of the Plinko task where participants 
would observe two simultaneous ball drops, one of each colour, rather than one colour at a time 
(as in Experiment 1). As with Experiment 1, participants also estimated both green and red 
distributions when prompted.
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4.8. Experiment 2: Results 
 Analysis of participants’ estimation accuracy reveals a main effect of attended colour, 
such that participants performed significantly better when estimating the attended as opposed to 
the unattended distribution, F(1,28) = 8.91, MSE = .01, p < .01. There was no main effect of 
distribution, F < 1, nor were there any significant interactions (Figure 4.7). 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4.7. Experiment 2 Estimation Accuracy. Depicts distribution estimation accuracy for 
all distribution pairs across both distance and overlap conditions as a function of attention. While 
no manipulation was used to sustain participant’s attention on the target distribution, they were 
asked to focus one distribution over another, despite knowing they would eventually have to 
estimate both. 
 
In contrast to Experiment 1, there was a significant effect of condition in this experiment, 
F(1,28) = 7.05, MSE = .03, p < .05. Specifically, participants tended to do worse overall when 
 84 
estimating distributions that overlapped with each other relative to conditions in which the 
distribution differed in the distance between means (Figure 4.8). This was even true for 
distributions that participants were asked to attend to. Although the same effect was not 
significant in Experiment 1, it was numerically in the same direction – better performance for 
distributions differing in distance vs. overlap conditions (compare Figures 4.5 and 4.8). 
 
 
 
Figure 4.8. Experiment 2 Accuracy by Condition. Depicts distribution estimation accuracy for 
Experiment 2 as a function of distribution pair condition. Distance condition had distributions 
pairs at 0.5SD, 1.0SD, and 1.5SD apart for distributions 1, 2, and 3, respectively. Overlap 
condition had distributions overlapping at 26%, 44%, and 66% for distributions 1, 2, and 3, 
respectively. 
 
Interestingly, participants still tended to have difficulty estimating a narrow distribution 
that overlapped with a wide one. Counterintuitively, that was true particularly when participants 
were specifically asked to pay more attention to the narrow distribution, F(1,28) = 6.52, MSE = 
.01, p < .05 (Figure 4.9). Despite the improvement in accuracy when attending to a target 
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distribution across all other distribution pairs, here they continued to estimate the attended 
distribution as being much wider than it actually was. 
 
 
 
Figure 4.9. Experiment 2 Overlapping Distribution Accuracy. Depicts distribution estimation 
accuracy for Experiment 2 as a function of attended distribution demonstrating a significant 
reduction in narrow vs. wide accuracy despite attentional focus. 
 
4.9. Experiment 2: Discussion 
 The results of Experiment 2, where we had participants allocate their attention towards 
one of the two distributions in each pair, demonstrated an improvement in estimation accuracy 
for the attended vs. the unattended distribution. In addition, while Experiment 1 showed 
performance trending downwards for distribution pairs that overlapped with each other, that 
effect was significant in Experiment 2. Finally, as with Experiment 1, participants had 
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considerable difficulty estimating the narrow distribution when it was presented in context with a 
wider distribution, despite the fact that they were asked to attend to it. 
 
4.10. Experiment 3: Introduction 
 Despite the fact that results of Experiment 2 showed a benefit of attention on 
representational accuracy, there was no direct measure to determine whether participants did 
indeed allocate their attention to the target distribution. Furthermore, the effect of attentional 
allocation was subtle, with the largest effects being the impact of placing the distributions in an 
overlapping configuration (i.e., the overlap condition and the wide/narrow distribution pair). 
Therefore, the purpose of the current experiment was to replicate the findings of Experiment 2 
while introducing an added element to the Plinko task that both enforced and measured the 
allocation of attention. 
 
4.11. Experiment 3: Method 
Participants 
 A total of 39 undergraduate students (M = 20.5, SD = 3.2, 6 male) from the University of 
Waterloo participated in the current experiment. All participants reported normal or corrected-to-
normal vision and gave written consent to participation. As remuneration for their involvement, 
participants received bonus grade credit towards one of their Psychology courses that term. The 
experiment and all procedures were approved by the University of Waterloo, Office of Research 
Ethics. 
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Procedure 
Participants completed a similar Plinko task to that of Experiment 2 with simultaneous 
ball drops of both red and green distributions. The same distribution pairs used in Experiments 1 
and 2 were also used here. The colour of ball drops that participants were asked to attend to was 
counterbalanced between participants. While the prior experiment presented simultaneous ball 
drops as a means to prevent participants from shifting their attention to the unattended 
distribution on trials where the unattended balls fell, there wasn’t a mechanism to encourage 
participants to sustain their attention on the target colour. Theoretically, participants could still 
attend to the other colour of ball drops despite instructions not to. 
To ensure participants sustained attention on the colour instructed, participants were 
given a dual Sustained Attention to Response Task (SART; Robertson et al., 1997) whilst they 
observed the ball drops (Figure 4.10). In the original SART task, participants are presented with 
a rapid sequence of numbers and are told to press a button to every number except one. 
Commission errors – a failure to withhold a response to the specified number – represent failures 
of sustained attention (Robertson et al., 1997). The total proportion of go stimuli was 67%, a 
proportion associated with minimal errors and limited influence of speed accuracy trade-offs 
(Wilson, Finkbeiner, de Joux, Russell, & Helton, 2016). 
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Figure 4.10. Plinko SART Task. Participants would observe ball drops from the top of the 
screen into one of 40 landing slots. As the balls fell between the 16th and 21st row of pegs, both 
red and green balls would change to an array of possible shapes or remain as circles. Participants 
were asked to press the mouse button if the colour ball they were attending to changed to any 
shape except for a star. 
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In the current experiment, the SART task was modified such that participants had to pay 
attention to one of two coloured distributions of balls. As the balls fell, both the attended and 
unattended balls independently changed to an array of possible shapes mid-fall. Participants were 
instructed to click the left mouse button when they saw the attended colour circle change to a 
square, diamond, triangle, or semi-circle. Participants were asked to withhold their response if 
they saw the attended ball change to a star or on trials in which the ball did not change. The 
change point on each trial occurred in the middle half of its travel time with its change point 
determined randomly within that range to prevent a perseverative response style. The middle 
range was chosen to avoid early or late stages of a ball’s trajectory. Early changes might mean 
the participant could ignore the ball’s continuing trajectory for that trial and late changes had the 
possibility of inducing a kind of attentional blink potentially impairing participant’s ability to 
accurately encode the shape’s final landing position (Dux & Marois, 2009). 
 
4.12. Experiment 3: Results 
Evaluation of participant’s performance on the SART task indicates that participants 
completed this component of the experiment according to instructions, with mean response 
accuracy of 89% (SD = .07%; Figure 4.11). As with the previous experiment, distribution 
estimation results showed a main effect of attended distribution on estimation accuracy, F(1,37) 
= 5.0, MSE = .01, p < .05 (Figure 4.12), demonstrating that participants performed better when 
estimating ball drops for the attended distribution (i.e., the same distribution for which they 
completed the SART task).  
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Figure 4.11. Experiment 3 SART Task Accuracy. Depicts histogram of SART accuracy for all 
participants in Experiment 3. 
 
There was also a main effect of condition such that, as with prior experiments, 
participants were less accurate estimating distributions that were overlapping with each other, 
F(1,37) = 7.82, MSE = .04, p < .01 (Figure 4.13). However, there were no other significant main 
effects or interactions. While Experiment 2 demonstrated an overall reduction in performance 
when participants had to estimate wide and narrow distributions that completely overlapped, this 
effect was not present in the current experiment, F < 1. However, as with all prior experiments, 
participants did a worse job overall at estimating the narrow distribution when it overlapped with 
a wide one, t(38) = -6.8, SE = .02, p < .001 (Figure 4.14). 
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Figure 4.12. Experiment 3 Estimation Accuracy. Depicts distribution estimation accuracy as a 
function of attention. Attended distributions were ones where participants completed the SART 
task whilst observing ball drops. 
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Figure 4.13. Estimation Accuracy by Condition. Depicts distribution estimation accuracy as a 
function of condition. As with Experiments 1 and 2, the distance condition placed distribution 
pairs 0.5SD, 1.0SD, and 1.5SD apart while the overlap condition had distribution pairs 
overlapping by 24%, 44%, and 66%. 
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Figure 4.14. Estimation Accuracy for Wide vs. Narrow Distribution. Depicts distribution 
estimation accuracy for the fourth and final distribution pair common to both groups. 
Specifically, the distribution pair that had a narrow distribution overlapping a wider distribution 
with the same mean. 
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4.13. Experiment 3: Discussion 
 Consistent with the results from Experiment 2, the results of Experiment 3 demonstrated 
an advantage in distribution estimation accuracy when participants completed the SART task on 
those ball drops. Additionally, participants continued to have relatively more difficulty with 
distributions that were overlapping. Notably, participants again had the most difficulty with 
estimating the narrow distribution when it overlapped with the wider one, even when asked to 
attend to it through the use of the SART task. 
 
4.14. Experiment 4: Introduction 
While the prior two experiments demonstrated that the allocation of attention improved 
participants’ ability to represent distributions, these effects did not extend to instances where the 
distribution pairs consisted of a wide and narrow distribution with overlapping means. Although 
the results consistently demonstrated lower overall performance as the distributions began to 
overlap significantly, the marked reduction in performance in the most difficult of distribution 
pairs warranted further exploration. Given that both the wide and narrow distributions always 
shared the same mean, it was important to explore whether the difficulty observed with this 
distribution pair was merely a result of that fact. That is, if participants’ past performance with 
these distributions was a true reflection of difficulty with narrow distributions in the context of 
wider ones, then separating the means of the distributions should still produce the same pattern 
of performance. However, in the event that the results reflect the fact that both distributions 
shared the same mean, then separating the means should modulate the effect. Additionally, while 
prior experiments demonstrated a performance improvement for attended vs unattended 
distributions, performance was relatively poor for narrow distributions that overlapped wide 
 95 
distributions even though their attention was allocated to ball drops from the narrower 
distribution. Consequently, Experiment 4 set out to investigate whether attention affected the 
ability to represent these narrow distributions relative to when they were unattended in the 
context of overlapping with a wider distribution. 
 
4.15. Experiment 4: Method 
Participants 
 A total of 20 undergraduate students (M = 20.4, SD = 1.7 years, 6 male) from the 
University of Waterloo participated in the current experiment. All participants reported normal 
or corrected-to-normal vision and gave written consent to participation. As remuneration for 
their involvement, participants received bonus grade credit towards one of their Psychology 
courses that term. The experiment and all procedures were approved by the University of 
Waterloo, Office of Research Ethics. 
 
Procedure 
The current study contained distribution pairs consisting only of a narrow distribution 
overlapping with a wide distribution. There were a total of 4 distribution pairs, with the distance 
between means of the narrow and wide distributions differing slightly in each pair (4, 6, 8, and 
10 slots apart for distribution pairs 1-4, respectively), as opposed to previous experiments where 
the means of the wide and narrow distributions were identical. This allowed us to explore 
whether distance between distribution means would ameliorate the performance deficit observed 
in prior experiments where the narrow and wide distributions shared the same means.  
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As in Experiment 2, balls from each pair of distributions fell from the top of the pegs into 
one of 40 landing slots. Participants were asked either to attend to only green balls or red balls. 
The colour of the aforementioned distributions varied such that, regardless of which color 
participants were asked to attend to, there would always be two narrow and two wide 
distributions of that colour (Figure 4.15). This means that, taking the narrow distributions for 
example, they would always have two narrow distributions they did attend to and two narrow 
distributions where they didn’t regardless of whether they were asked to attend to green or red 
ball drops.  For example, for participants asked to attend to green balls, they would be attending 
to the wide distribution in pairs 1 and 4 and the narrow distribution in pairs 2 and 3. This allowed 
us to directly compare the effect of attention on representation accuracy of narrow and wide 
distributions within-subjects as opposed to prior experiments where participants were either 
attending to the wide or narrow distribution between-subjects as had been the case for all prior 
experiments in this chapter. Additionally, a third group of participants were given no instructions 
regarding the allocation of attention to serve as a control condition. The order of distribution 
pairs was counterbalanced across participants.  
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Figure 4.15. Experiment 4 Distribution Pairs. Top panel depicts distribution pairs used for Experiment 4. All distribution pairs 
consisted of a narrow distribution overlapping with a wider one, comparable to the fourth distribution pair in Experiments 1-3. Middle 
and bottom panels demonstrate how participants always attended to two narrow and two wide distributions when given instructions to 
attend to one ball colour. Solid lines denote attended distributions while dashed lines denote unattended distributions. 
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4.16. Experiment 4: Results 
To examine the hypothesis that prior results for one specific pair of distributions was due 
to the fact that the means were identical (i.e., the narrow and wide Gaussians), an analysis was 
run looking at estimation accuracy as a function of distribution (with the means of both 
distributions being further apart in each successive pair) and width (wide vs. narrow). As with 
prior experiments that demonstrated poorer estimation performance for narrow distributions 
when it overlapped with a wider one, there was a significant main effect of distribution width 
such that participants were less accurate at estimating the narrower distributions, F(1,18) = 
35.84, MSE = .04, p < .001 (Figure 4.16). There were no other main effects or interactions, 
suggesting that participants did not benefit in their estimations as a function of how far apart the 
wide and narrow distributions were placed relative to each other, all Fs ≤ 1. These results suggest 
that the difficulty noted in previous experiments with respect to poor performance in narrow vs 
wide distributions was not an artefact of the distribution means being the same. 
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Figure 4.16. Experiment 4 Estimation Accuracy by Distribution Width. Depicts estimation 
accuracy for the wide distributions in solid lines and narrow distributions in dashed lines. 
Distance between distribution means within pairs increased from left to right. 
 
 
 Given the only factor affecting performance in the distribution estimation task appeared 
to be the width of the distribution, focus shifted to the effect of attention on how well individuals 
estimated both wide and narrow distributions. As previously mentioned, individuals attending to 
either color of ball drops would end up attending to a combination of both narrow and wide 
distributions over the course of the experiment (Figure 4.16). Analysis of within-subjects effects 
revealed a main effect of distribution width, F(1,18) = 35.84, MSE = .02, p<.001, attention, 
F(1,18) = 4.6, MSE = .004, p < .05, and an attention by distribution width interaction, F(1,18) = 
5.12, MSE = .004, p < .05 (Figure 4.17).  
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Further exploration of the attention by distribution width interaction revealed that the 
primary improvement of estimation accuracy occurred when participants were attending to the 
narrow distribution. That is, under conditions where participants performed at their worst in prior 
experiments (i.e., the narrow distribution), performance was significantly improved when they 
were asked to focus on those ball drops relative to the condition in which they attended to the 
wider distributions (Figure 4.17). 
 
 
 
Figure 4.17. Experiment 4 Wide vs. Narrow Estimation Accuracy by Attention. Depicts 
distribution estimation accuracy for attended and unattended distributions as a function of 
distribution width. Green markers indicate no-instruction control performance. Asterisk denotes 
significant difference between attended and unattended narrow distribution estimation accuracy.  
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 With respect to whether these results represent a facilitative effect of focusing attention 
above and beyond passive observation or whether attention represents a gating mechanism, 
performance was also examined as a function of whether participants received a specific 
distribution colour to focus on or given no attention instructions at all. Overall estimation 
accuracy was comparable between the groups with no main effect of attention instruction, F < 1. 
While performance in the attention condition appears to be higher when participants attended to 
the narrow condition, this difference failed to reach statistical significance, F(1,18) = 2.26, MSE 
= .02, p = .15.  
 
4.17. Experiment 4: Discussion 
These results suggest that participants were able to represent both distributions quite well 
regardless of whether or not they were instructed to attend to either at the exclusion of the other. 
However, when asked to allocate attention to one of the distributions in each pair, participants 
were more accurate when they were attending to the narrow distribution than when they weren’t. 
Taken together, the results seem to suggest that attention gates the process of representing 
regularities, such that impairing the ability to freely allocate attention to the environment may 
impair performance. 
 
4.18. Discussion 
The results of the current study appear to demonstrate the robust and reliable role that 
attention plays in facilitating the building of mental representations. Through multiple 
experiments, our results demonstrated that individuals consistently did better at estimating the 
mean and variance of an unknown distribution of visual events when attentional resources were 
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allocated to those events. This was true regardless of whether participants were merely instructed 
to voluntarily attend to one of two distributions (Experiments 2 and 4) or whether there was a 
secondary task designed to enforce sustained attention on one distribution at the expense of the 
other (Experiment 3). These results are generally consistent with literature that shows attention is 
an important component of many visual learning processes including visual statistical learning 
(Baker, Olson, & Behrmnann, 2004; Turk-Browne, Junge, & Scholl, 2005), probability learning 
(Kabata et al., 2014), sequence learning (Kimura, Widmann, & Schröger, 2010), and implicit 
learning (Jiménez & Mendéz, 1999). 
However, when viewed in a broader context, these results indicate that individuals are 
quite capable of observing and representing multiple distributions simultaneously. This was 
particularly evident in the first experiment where no attentional constraints were placed on 
participants. That said, the results of the current study did demonstrate that individuals find it 
much more difficult to build a representation in the context of other competing information that 
are similar to the one being represented. Throughout all experiments, participants found it much 
harder to estimate distributions that overlapped with each other as opposed to when the 
boundaries of each respective distribution were separated from each other. This difficulty was 
exacerbated when the distributions shared the same mean (i.e., narrow over wide). This is 
consistent with literature demonstrating that similarity between targets and distractors require 
more attentional scrutiny (Rausei, Makovski, & Jiang, 2007), possibly explaining the overall 
lower performance under these circumstances. This is also consistent with work in our lab 
demonstrating that individuals have considerable difficulty shifting from representing a wide 
distribution towards a narrow distribution even when those distributions are presented 
sequentially (Filipowicz et al., under consideration). 
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In terms of the mechanism by which attention affects the model building process, the 
results of Experiment 1 strongly suggested that individuals were able to effectively represent two 
distributions at once without any attentional manipulations. While later manipulations did result 
in improved performance for the attended vs. unattended distributions, it appeared as though 
much of that difference resulted from a reduction in performance for the unattended distributions 
relative to Experiment 1 levels rather than a heightening of accuracy for the attended 
distributions (Figure 4.18). This is also consistent with results from Experiment 4 where we 
manipulated the target of participants’ focus as an independent variable while asking them to 
perform what was the most difficult estimation task from all three prior experiments. While 
participants did benefit from focusing on the narrow distributions relative to when their attention 
was on the wider ones, participants performed quite well when they were simply free to attend to 
either distribution relative to when their focus was constrained by task instructions. This is 
consistent with the results from Chapter 2 showing that participants were best able to represent 
regularity in their environment when working memory resources were freed up rather than 
exploited to hold recent events in mind, even when those events were relevant to the mental 
representation they needed to build in the first place.  
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Figure 4.18. Experiments 1-3 Combined Attended vs. Unattended vs. Control. Depicts 
relative performance across Experiments 1-3. Dashed lines indicate unattended distributions in 
each respective pair while solid lines indicate performance when attention was focused on the 
target distribution. Both Experiments 2 and 3 had significant main effects of attention. 
 
In summary, it appears that attentional resources act as a gating mechanism and are most 
helpful for the building of mental representations when they are freed up to passively observe 
visual regularity in the environment. Through multiple experiments, participants were 
consistently better at determining the underlying structure of a series of visually presented ball 
drops when they were focused on those events relative to a second distribution to which they 
were not. However, the overall pattern of performance under these circumstances were 
comparable to conditions where individuals were free to self-regulate the allocation of their 
attentional resources. To the extent that attentional resources act as a mechanism for building and 
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updating mental representation, it appears as though it serves as a gating mechanism in the 
information processing system as individuals seek to infer the structure of their environment 
through limited and efficient observation (Gershman & Niv, 2010; Gottlieb, 2012). 
 
 
  
  
106 
Chapter 5: General Discussion 
 The ability to build and update mental models of the environment represents an important 
component to effective and efficient decision making as it allows individuals to predict the 
consequences of action choices without over-sampling the environment (Griffiths & Tenenbaum, 
2006; Tenenbaum et al., 2011, Johnson-Laird, 2013). The current thesis explored mental model 
building and updating from the point of view of the neural correlates, and the ancillary cognitive 
abilities that facilitate the process. 
 Chapter 2 explored the brain regions putatively involved in facilitating mental model 
building and updating. Building on existing work in the literature with brain-damaged 
individuals highlighting a likely role of the right-hemisphere in this process (Danckert et al., 
2012), Chapter 2 investigated the neural regions that played an important role in the ability of 
healthy individuals to build and update mental models. Neurologically healthy participants 
played a serial zero-sum game with a computer that utilized a variety of potentially exploitable 
strategies. Results indicated that individuals were reasonably skilled at modeling and exploiting 
the bias of the computer opponent as demonstrated by steadily rising rates of optimal play choice 
over the course of each relevant epoch. Imaging data captured during these instances where 
individuals were able to model and exploit their computer opponent demonstrated significant 
activation in a variety of areas. Most notably, a network of parietal cortex, cingulate cortex, 
striate cortex, and prefrontal cortex.  
The network of regions activated likely contributes in distinct ways to model building 
and updating, with further research needed to elucidate the separable contributions of each 
region. Given research findings from other domains it is reasonable to speculate that the parietal 
cortex, classically characterized as an area important for the allocation of visual attention 
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(Mesulam, 1981; Hopfinger et al., 2000; Corbetta & Shulman, 2002; Ferber & Danckert, 2006), 
coupled with prefrontal cortex, typically implicated in executive control (Hare et al., 2009; Geng, 
2013), are involved in the exploration and accumulation of evidence in pursuit of a mental model 
(d’Acremont et al., 2013a; 2013b). Once built, such a model needs to be evaluated in the context 
of expected and observed outcomes. Relevant activations in both the anterior cingulate cortex, 
typically implicated in error detection and belief-based decision making tasks (Zhu et al., 2012), 
and striate cortex, typically characterized as representing or encoding relative risk and reward 
signals (Levin et al., 2012) may co-ordinate this process. These results are consistent with other 
work in our lab demonstrating their importance in the model building and updating process 
(Danckert et al., 2012, Stöttinger, Filipowicz, Valadao, Culham, Goodale, Anderson, & 
Danckert, 2015) in addition to patient studies that implicate a subset of these areas in patients 
who demonstrate difficulty with this ability (Danckert et al., 2012; Stöttinger et al., 2014). It is 
worth noting some limitations to this work that suggest future directions of research. First, the 
nature of the block-design coupled with a relatively smaller sample size limits the ability to 
detect areas of activation that come online the moment a model is built or updated and instead 
infers that these processes are underway throughout the block of trials. Nevertheless, our results 
are consistent with similar work employing more event-related designs (Stöttinger et al., 2015). 
A potentially fruitful avenue for future research would involve replication of these findings while 
exploring the temporal dynamics of how this network operates. It would be important to 
corroborate the purported roles that the above areas play in the updating process with research 
that isolates their role in context. In addition to utilizing event-related designs in future research, 
this investigation could involve the use of alternative imaging techniques with greater temporal 
resolution that fMRI (e.g., EEG/ERP). 
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Chapter 3 consisted of a series of behavioural experiments examining the role of 
Working Memory in model building and updating. Participants completed a serial prediction task 
asking them to estimate the mean of a distribution whilst completing a dual task that either 
constrained WM resources through the use of a 2-back task or a 0-back dual-task control that 
wouldn’t constrain working memory resources. While it was initially hypothesized that 
expending WM resources to focus on elements of the environment that contained information 
relevant to the model to be built (e.g., recent examples of the distribution), those were the 
conditions in which performance was at its worst. Specifically, participants were slowest to 
update their representations of the central tendency of a new distribution when they were asked 
to hold in WM information about the stimuli that were relevant or congruent with the model they 
needed up update (i.e., Location in E1, Shape in E2/3). These results are consistent with prior 
research demonstrating constrained WM resources impair the ability to learn and benefit from 
regularity in the environment and detect salient changes (Rouder et al., 2011; Annac et al., 2013; 
Travis et al., 2013). Taken together, Chapter 2 suggested that free WM resources represent an 
important gating mechanism to effective and efficient updating of mental representations such 
that constrained or reduced capacity may impair the process. However, these results are 
somewhat limited by the relatively constrained response choices made by participants, coupled 
with the fact that the presence of said models were inferred by the tendency to choose one of 
these limited options. This could be addressed in future research by increasing the range and 
complexity of possible response choices (as was done in the “Plinko task”). Additionally, while 
the results point to the importance of WM resources, further research could investigate the 
relationship between WM capacity or WM rehabilitation and the ability to build and update 
mental models. 
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 Chapter 4 examined the role of attention in the building of mental representations. Using 
a novel task (Filipowicz, Valadao, Anderson, & Danckert, 2014) designed to allow participants 
to input data that more closely reflected their internal representation, participants observed ball 
drops reflecting two distinct distributions of events. Across four experiments, a variety of 
manipulations were applied to alter the allocation of attentional resources to one distribution over 
the other. Results generally showed that, without any attentional constraints, participants were 
able to represent and report both distributions with comparable accuracy. However, when asked 
to attend to one of them, participants were significantly better at representing the attended vs. the 
unattended distribution. However, when taken together with data where participants were not 
told where or how to attend to the distributions (i.e., Experiment 4), performance in the attended 
conditions were not significantly different from controls. These results are consistent with the 
interpretation that attention, as with WM, act as a gating mechanism for the ability to build and 
update mental representations. Despite this conclusion, only a limited subset of the dataset 
directly contrasted attended vs. unattended in relation to a control condition without attentional 
constraints (i.e., Experiment 4). While Experiment 1 did demonstrate better performance for the 
distributions pairs without any attentional instruction, it’s important to note that the interleaved 
ball drops arguably made the task of representing each distribution more difficult than when both 
distributions displayed ball drops simultaneously. Additional research would seek to replicate the 
findings of Experiment 4 using distributions without equal means (as in Experiments 1-3) with 
simultaneous presentation of ball drops and comparable controls (i.e., no attentional 
instructions). 
 In summary, the work presented in this thesis contributes to a more comprehensive 
understanding of how individuals build and update mental representations of their environment. 
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The present research helps establish a working knowledge of the neural network that co-
ordinates this process including parietal cortex, anterior cingulate and anterior insula – regions 
implicated in both patient work and related fMRI studies (Karnath, 2004; Danckert et al., 2012, 
Stöttinger et al., 2014). These areas appear to play a co-ordinated role in the integration of 
evidence and the evaluation of predicted vs. observed outcomes. Additional data in this thesis 
outline the cognitive abilities that play a facilitative role as a gateway for incoming information, 
namely attention and working memory.  
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